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CHAPTER I.
THE PROCESSES INVOLVED IN BUSINESS CYCLES.
I. The Plan of Attack.
As knowledge of business cycles grows, more effort is required to
master it.Formerly, an attack upon the problem required no special
preparations.Early writers upon "commercial crises" could assume
that they and their readers were familiar with the phenomena to be
explained and the methods to be used. They felt no need of collecting
statistics, of compiling business annals, of comparing the amplitude
and the timing of cyclical fluctuations in different activities, of de-
veloping and defining technical concepts.After the briefest of intro-
ductions, they plunged into a discussion of the cause of crises, and
worked such evidence as they cited into their argumentation.In
consequence, their discussions had an agreeable directness, which our
generation may envy, but cannot wisely imitate.
Elaborate preparations have become necessary, not because the
direct attacks upon the problem proved futile, but because they won
so many and such different results.Every investigator of the cause
of commercial crises seemed to make out a case for the hypothesis
he favored.In trying to prove their divergent explanations correct,
successive theorists did prove that business cycles were more intricate
phenomena than any of them had surmised.These cycles turned
out to be complexes, made up of divergent fluctuations in many
processes.Familiarity with the phenomena to be explained came to
mean familiarity with the interrelations among cyclical fluctuations
in the production of raw materials, industrial equipment and con-
sumers' goods; in the volume of savings and investments; in the pro-
motion of new enterprises, in banking, in the disbursement of incomes
to individuals and the spending of incomes, in prices, costs, profits
and the emotional aberrations of business judgments.However
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conversant he may be with practical affairs and economic theory, no
competent investigator now supposes that he can explain the fluctua-
tions of• these interrelated factors on the basis of his general
knowledge.
This lesson from experience in making theories of business cycles
has been confirmed in recent years by work with statistics.Serried
tables of figures, and charts drawn from them, have made our knowl-
edge of cyclical fluctuations much more definite.Year by year the
range covered by statistical compilations has grown wider, the
accuracy of reporting has improved, and the technical methods of
analysis have become more refined and more powerful. But we have
no statistical evidence of business cycles as wholes. What the data
show us are the fluctuations of particular processes—producing pig
iron, transporting freight, clearing bank checks, selling goods by mail,
declaring dividends, and so on. And these fluctuations differ widely.
In certain cases we assemble or average the data for various processes,
and say that we have "indexes" of cyclical fluctuations in wholesale
prices, physical production, the volume of trade, or even "genera.!
business conditions."Yet the most inclusive indexes we can make
fall far short of showing all that we mean by business cycles.The
more intensively we work, the more we realize that this term is a
synthetic product of the imagination—a product whose history is
characteristic of our ways of learning.Overtaken by a series of
strange experiences our predecessors leaped to a broad conception,
gave it a name, and began to invent explanations, as if they knew
what their words meant. But in the process of explaining they dem-
onstrated how inadequate their knowledge was.From their work
we can learn much; the first lesson is that we must find out more
about the facts before we can choose among the old explanations, or
improve upon them.
An inquiry into business cycles, then, cannot wisely begin by de-
fining the general concept, and proceed systematically to take up one
part of the whole after another.It should begin rather with the in-
dividual processes which can be studied objectively, seeking to find
what these processes are, how they affect each other, and what sort of
whole they make up.
The best way to learn what processes are involved in business
cycles is to profit by the discoveries of earlier workers. Most of these
men found the clue to business cycles in the recurrent fluctuations of
some single economic process.All together they may not haveTHE PROCESSES INVOLVED IN BUSINESS CYCLES3
covered the whole field.But in no other way can we get so compre-
hensive a view of business cycles, or such vivid insight into their com-
plexities, as by following a series of persuasive demonstrations that
each one of a dozen different processes reveals the factor of crucial
importance.
It is not advisable to attack the statistical data until we have
made this survey of theories.For while the statistics will come to
seem scanty as our demands develop, they are sufficiently abundant
and diverse, susceptible of enough transformations and combinations,
to make hopeless a purely empirical investigation.At every turn,
we shall need working hypotheses to guide our selection of data, and
to suggest ways of analyzing and combining them.Our survey of
theories will provide us with the most promising hypotheses which
have been invented. Not until we are thus equipped can we begin
constructive work upon the problem of business cycles, confident that
we are not overlooking elements already proved to be important.
II. The Discovery of the Problem.
Serious efforts to explain business crises and depressions began
amid the violent fluctuations in trade which followed the Napoleonic
Wars. For a century or more Western Europe had been experiencing
at intervals speculative manias, glutted markets, and epidemics of
bankruptcy.The Mississippi Bubble and the South Sea Scheme
which had burst in France and England in 1720, and the commercial
crises of 1763, 1772, 1783 and 1793, not to mention less notable cases,
had excited much discussion.1But the eighteenth-century writers
dealt mainly with the dramatic surface events; concerning the under-
lying causes they developed no arresting ideas. By 1815 progressive
changes in economic organization were forcing the problem to the
fore, and men were better equipped to attack it.The Physiocrats
and' Adam Smith had made political economy a branch of philosophy,
if not of science, and when the wars ended Ricardo was recasting the
theory into the form which is still dominant.
It was not the orthodox economists, however, who gave the prob-
lem of crises and depressions its place in economics, but sceptics
who had profited by and then reacted against their teachings. From
Adam Smith to Mill, and even to Alfred Marshall, the classical mas-
Mentor Bouniatian, Studien zur Theorie und Geschichte der Wirtchczftskrisen.
II Geschzchte der Handelekrzsen in Engtand, 1640-1840.Munich, 1908.4 BUSINESS CYCLES
ters have paid but incidental attention to the rhythmical oscillations
of trade in their systematic treatises.They have been concerned
primarily to elucidate principles which hold "in the long run," or
apply to the "normal state."To them crises and depressions have
been of secondary interest—proper subjects for special study or oc-
casional reference, but not among the central problems of economic
theory.2 To force into prominence the fact that economic activities
are subject to recurring phases of contraction and expansion was the
work primarily of men who were critics, not merely of orthodox
economics, but also of modern society—men such as Sismondi and
Rodbertus.
J. C. L. Simonde de Sismondi was an Italian Swiss who had early
become enamored of Adam Smith's doctrines and expounded them for
continental readers in a treatise De Ia Richesse Commerciale.After
publishing this book in 1803, Sismondi had turned to medieval re-
search and won European celebrity as the historian of the Italian
Republics. Then an invitation from the Scotch physicist, Sir David
Brewster, to write an article on "Political Economy" for the new
Edinburgh Encyclojxsdia, recalled him to his first theme in 1818.
The time was one of widespread distress. As Napoleon's fall drew
near, English manufacturers and merchants, anticipating the reopen-
ing of hungry continental markets, accumulated large stores of goods
for export.Waterloo was fought in June, 1815.There followed
several months of brisk trade and optimistic speculation. But before
the year was out it became clear that European consumers lacked
the means to buy freely. Heavy consignments of British goods over-
stocked the markets and many of the consignors went bankrupt. The
year after Waterloo was one of distress from beginning to end.
Recovery began in the spring of 1817 and made rapid progress, so
that 1818 showed great industrial activity.But in 1819 fresh diffi-
culties occurred, and depression returned to last through 1820.Not
1 AdamSmith mentions the "knavery and extravagance" of the South Sea
Company's "stock-jobbing projects," (Wealth oJ Nationa, Cannan's ed., vol. ii, p.. 236);
Ricardo speaks of "revulsions in trade" accompanying the outbreaks or the ending of
great wars (PrinpZcs of Political Economy, Gonner's ed., pp. 250, 251); Miii discusses
"commercial crises" in his chapters on the Rate of Interest and on the Tendency of
Profits to a Minimum, besides mentioning them incidentally in several other passages
(Principles of Political Economy, Ashley's ed., pp. 561, 641, 644, 651, 709, 734-735, 845);
Marshall puts a book on "Fluctuations of Industry, Trade and Credit," not into his
Principles of Economics, but into his volume on Money, Credit and Commerce, Lon-
don, 1923, pp. 234-263.THE PROCESSES INVOLVED IN BUSINESS CYCLES5
until 1821 did a sustained revival begin,—and the prosperity which
presently reigned ended in the panic of December, l825.
Sismondi had accepted Brewster's invitation readily, thinking he
had merely to write a brief exposition of "principles universally ad-
mitted." But as he studied current developments he was assailed by
doubts concerning the theories he had accepted from Adam Smith.
I was deeply affected, (he wrote), by the commercial crisis
which Europe had experienced of late, by the cruel sufferings
of the industrial workers which I had witnessed in Italy,
Switzerland and France, and which all reports showed to have
been at least as severe in England, in Germany and in Belgium.
The case of England was to him particularly significant—that "sur-
prising country which seemed to be undergoing a great experiment
for the instruction of the rest of the world."If the land of the
economists, the land where the doctrine of economic liberty had
freest sway in government, the land where the new methods of ma-
chine production had scored their greatest triumphs—if that land was
plunged in want by the return of peace, must there not be something
wrong in the philosophy of laissez faire? When everyone was free
to produce as much as he could, it seemed that no one could buy
what he needed to consume. How could this be? Sismondi set him-
self to solve the problem. The result was his Nouveaux Principes
d'Economie Politique, published in 1819.
We should not expect the first efforts to explain so complicated a
phenomenon as a business crisis to be free from crudities.Nor was
Sismondi fully equipped to solve the problem he had posed; though
an excellent observer, he lacked analytic finesse.Yet he made several
suggestions, ill coordinated with each other, which were developed
and combated by later writers, and which continue to play roles
of importance in theories now current.
One of these suggestions is that commercial organization is at
fault.The business man, as Sismondi phrases it, caters to a "meta-
physical public"—customers whose numbers, tastes, consumption and
purchasing power are all unknown to him, and all variable.The
only guide he has in planning how much to produce is prices.By
'See the conspectus of English business annals in Chapter IV below, or better the
chapter on England in Business Annals, by Willard L. Thorp, National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research, 1926.
'See the prefaces to the first and second editions. The latter appeared in 18276 BUSINESS CYCLES
comparing present prices with costs, he decides whether to increase or
restrict his output in the near future.
Unfortunately this comparison is made by all the producers
at the same time ...andall of them together, ignorant of
how much their competitors will undertake, nearly always
exceed the limit which they had in view.5
A second suggestion is that in periods of industrial activity the
income available for buying consumers' goods falls short of the value
of the goods sent to market. This idea sounds modern, but Sismondi's
supporting analysis offered a broad target to his detractors.The
purchasing power available to absorb the produce of any year, he
stoutly contended, is the aggregate income of the preceding year—a
notion probably suggested by his life among the peasants of Italy.
When capacity to produce is increasing rapidly through the introduc-
tion of machinery, the markets must become glutted frequently.For
the faster the increase in production, the wider will be the gap between
last year's income and this year's output°
Still a third suggestion embodies in quaint form the "over-saving"
theory of crises.In opulent nations, production often goes astray
because its volume is determined by the abundance of capital seeking
investment rather than by the demand of consumers. Of course the
latter demand is the only safe guide; the fact that merchants and
manufacturers have money to invest in new ventures does not guar-
antee a market for their wares.7
Sismondi laid most stress, however, upon an idea often repeated
but never clearly worked out in his book: the fundamental cause of
crises is inequality in the distribution of incomes.
It is a serious error into which most of the modern economists
have fallen to represent consumptionas a power without limits,
always ready to devour an infinite output....Theneeds of
the laboring man are narrowly limited of necessity.
The masses do not wish luxuries so much as they wish respite from
toil.But when methods of production are improved, our economic
institutions, instead of giving the workers leisure, keep them busy as
long as ever and increase the volume of products offered for sale.
'Nouveaux Pthwipes, 2d ed., I, 325-330.
The same,I,106, 121-124.
'The same, I, 367-368.THE PROCESSES INVOLVED IN BUSINESS CYCLES•7
Who is to buy? After food, clothing and housing on a meager scale
have been provided for the wage-earners, the chief market for further
goods is the market for luxuries. The desire for such goods is indeed
without limit.But the increase of trade in luxuries puts a nation's
industry in a precarious position.Domestic consumers of luxuries
prefer foreign wares, and domestic producers must seek foreign out-
lets.Recent experience of unsalable consignments all over the globe
has shown the English how undependable is the export trade. Every-
one would be better off if the workers had incomes sufficient to give
the home demand a broad base.8
III. The Multiplying Solutions.
In a generation addicted to economic speculation, events which
affected so many fortunes as did the vicissitudes of trade were certain
to be explained in different ways.Sismondi was but. the most sug-
gestive among a numerous company of writers, most of whom had
their own explanations to offer and their own remedies to urge. Nor
did the differences of opinion grow less with the passing of time. On
the contrary, as later crises brought new men and new materials into
the discussion, the explanations multiplied.Gradually the plausible
views became standardized into several types of theory, each repre-
sented in the growing literature by a number of variants.Before the
end of the nineteenth century there had accumulated a body of ob-
servations and speculations sufficient to justify the writing of histories
of the theories of crises.'
A simple form of the "over-production" or "under-consumption"
theory was widely held. Through the adoption of modern machinery,
it was said, the power of society to produce has outgrown its power to
consume. Hence the periodical occurrence of "general gluts"—para-
doxical episodes in which superabundance causes want.Unable to
'same, I, 75-78, 357-372. The best modern account of Sismondi's views is given
by Albert Aftahon, L'Oeuvre Economique de Simori.de de Sismondi, Paris, 1899.
'The most elaborate of these histories is Eugen von Bergmann's Die Wirtschafts-
krzsen: Geschschte der nationalökonomischen Krisentheorien, Stuttgart, 1895. The best
accounts in English and French are Edward D. Jones' Economic Crises, New York,
1900, and Jean Lescure's Des Crises Générales et Périodiques de Surproduction, 3rd ed.,
Paris, 1923, pp. 313-412.
See also Harry E. Miller's paper on "Earlier Theories of Crises and Cycles in the
United States."Quarterly Journal of Economics, February, 1924 (xxxviii, pp. 294-329),
and Adolf Lowe's review of recent German contributions, "Der gegenwärtige Stand der
Konjunktprforschung in Deutschland," in Festgabe für Lu.jo Brentano, Munich and
Leipzig, 1925, vol. ii, pp. 329-377.8 BUSINESS CYCLES
sell their increasing output of goods at remunerative prices, em-
ployers are forced to close their factories and turn away their hands—
a remedy which aggravates the disease by reducing yet further the
community's power to purchase for consumption.
To most of the classical economists, the theory of general over-
production was a heresy, which they sought to extirpate by demon-
strating that the supply of goods of one sort necessarily constitutes
demand for goods of other sorts.2But maladjusted production they
allowed to be possible, and their brief references to crises usually
aimed to show how production becomes maladjusted through the
sinking of capital in unremunerative investments.They often held
that such misuse of capital was one result of "the tendency of profits
to a minimum." When the current rate of profits has fallen to an
unaccustomed level, the less sagacious capitalists, become dissatisfied
and embark. on ill-considered schemes. There result the production of
goods for which no market can be found, business failures, and loss of
confidence—in short, a crisis which extends over all lines of trade.
Another group of writers, among whom Schäifie was prominent,
accepted ill-adjusted production as the cause of crises; but accounted
for it by the complexity of modern business organization—the first of
Sismondi's suggestions.Not only are manufacturers compelled to
produce goods months in advance for markets whose changes they
cannot forecast, but investors are compelled years in advance to put
their funds into enterprises the need of which is uncertain. A close
adjustment of supply to demand cannot be maintained. Mistakes are
inevitable, and should be ascribed less to bad judgment than to the
planlessness of capitalistic production.
The most vigorous attempt to prove that crises are a chronic
disease of capitalism, however, was that made by Rodbertus and
elaborated by Karl Marx. The germ of this theory also is found in
Sismondi and Robert Owen. Wages form but a fraction of the value
of the product and increase less rapidly than power to produce.
Since the masses dependent upon wages constitute the bulk of the
population, it follows that consumers' demand. cannot keep pace
'2Upon this point, as upon many others, Malthus dissented from the "orthodox"
opinion.See his Principles of Political Economy, 1st ed., London, 1820, 351-375; 2d ed.,
London, 1836, 314-330.Mill admitted that "there may really be, though only while the
crisis lasts, an extreme depression of general prices, from what may be indiscriminately
called a glut of commodities or a dearth of money. But (he added) it is a great error
to suppose, with Sismondi, that a commercial crisis is the effect of a general excess of
production.It is simply the consequence of an excess of speculative purchases."Prin-
ciples of Political Economy, Ashley's ed., p. 561.TIlE PROCESSES INVOLVED IN BUSINESS CYCLES9
with current supply in seasons when factories are running at full
blast. Meanwhile the capitalist-employers are investing their current
savings in new productive enterprises, which presently add their
quotas to the goods seeking sale.This process of over-stocking the
market runs cumulatively until the time comes when the patent
impossibility of selling goods at a profit, or even at cost, brings on a
crisis.3
A wider acceptance was accorded to the "inflation" theory.An
increase in gold, in irredeemable paper money, in bank notes, or in
deposit currency was held to start an advance in prices.The latter
in turn stimulates business to great activity, which runs to extremes
in reckless investments and foolish speculation, and ends in a crash
of credit and widespread bankruptcy.
The "psychological" type of explanation was elaborated in John
Mills' paper "On Credit Cycles and the Origin of Commercial
Panics," published in l867. On this view the fundamental cause of
crises lies less in the character or abuse of economic institutions, than
in the emotional aberrations to which business judgments are subject.
Fair trade breeds optimism, optimism breeds recklessness, recklessness
breeds disaster.In their turn, the disasters of a crisis breed pessimism
and pessimism breeds stagnation. From depression business picks up
only when men's spirits recover on finding that matters have gone
less badly than they had fea.red.
As John Mills sought the fundamental cause of commercial fluctu-
ations in psychology, so W. Stanley Jevons sought it in physics.His
theory that the activity of solar radiation controls mundane weather,
weather controls crops, and crops control business conditions, was
first announced in 1875.
Finally, some economists, for example Wilhelm Roscher, despaired
of finding any theory which would account for all crises in the same
way.To these men a crisis is an "abnormal" event produced by
some "disturbing cause," such as the introduction of revolutionary
inventions, the development of new transportation lines, wars, the
return of peace, tariff revisions, monetary changes, crop failures,
changes in fashion, and the like.This view assumes that the equilib-
rium of economic processes has become so delicate that it may be
upset by untoward conjunctures of the most dissimilar kinds, and
'For a recent statement of the Marxian theory of crises by a sympathetic inter-
preter, see Otto Leichter, "Zur Analyse der Weltwirtschaftskrise," in Der lebendige
Marrismus, Festgabe zum 70. Geburtstage von Karl Kaulsky, Jena, 1924, pp. 45-100.
'Transactions of the Manchester Statistical Society, 1867-68, pp. 5-40.10 BUSINESS CYCLES
points to the conclusion that each crisis has its own special cause
which must be sought among the e'ents of the preceding year or two.
While all these speculations and others unmentioned concerning
the cause of crises and depressions were being debated, some progress
was made toward more exact observation and description of the
phenomena.The most distinguished pioneer in work of this sort
was Clement Juglar, whose elaborate treatise Des Crises Commerciales
et de leur Retour Périodiq'u.e was published in 1860 and again in 1889.
Max Wirth emphasized the international character of the major
crises in his Geschichte derHartdelskrisem(Frankfort a, M. 1858; 4th
ed., 1890), Tugan-Baranovski made an intensive study of English
crises in the nineteenth century,5 and numerous observers wrote
pamphlets or books on single crises.
In this descriptive work, much freer use was generally made of
statistical materials than in the theoretical essays.As the century
wore on, the data available concerning prices, currency, banking, in-
terest rates, foreign trade, production and employment grew wider
in range, more reliable, and more precise.Meanwhile statisticians
like Jevons and Edgeworth were developing a better technique for
wresting significant conclusions from masses of seemingly chaotic
data. But the use of these methods in theoretical inquiries was slow
to develop.
The most fundamental change to which the use of statistics con-
tributed was a change in the conception of the problem to be solved.
The earlier writers had sought for the cause merely of crises, or of
crises and depressions.It is true that a wider view had been sug-
gested occasionally.In 1833, an English journalist, John Wade,
remarked casually that
The commercial cycle is ordinarily completed in five or seven
years, within which terms it will be found, by reference to
our commercial history during the last seventy years, alternate
periods of prosperity and depression have been experienced.6
Presently this idea of cyclical oscillations was amplified by more
influential writers—Lord Overstone, Hyde Clark, William Langton.
first in Russian (1894), then in German (1901) and finally in French
under the title Les Crises IndustrieUes en Angleterre (Paris, 1913).
John Wade, History of the Middle and Working Ckzsses, 2d ed., London, 18a4, p. 211.THE PROCESSES INVOLVED IN BUSINESS CYCLES11
John Mills, Condy Raguet and Amasa Walker:it wasindeedimplied
in the numerous discussions of the "periodicity of crises." One could
talk about credit cycles and "periodic" crises, however, without de-
voting much attention to business revivals after depression, or the
process by which revivals grow into prosperity. But one could scarcely
use time series, showing the fluctuations of activity year after year,
without seeing that the developments in the non-crisis periods offered
quite as much a problem as did the crises themselves.Thus the use
of statistics hastened the time when economists passed on from the
theory of crises to the theory of business cycles.Clement Juglar's
great "book of facts" made clear the need of the step.8
So bald a statement as the preceding falls far short of doing justice
to the nineteenth century writers; but it suffices to indicate the
foundations upon which our contemporaries have built their more
elaborate theories. The latter conserve all of permanent value which
the older economists achieved, and contain in addition certain fresh
contributions to the subject.Accordingly, a more detailed account of
the leading explanations which have been offered recently will put
us in possession of the ideas most likely to prove useful in further
work.
IV. The Theories Now Current.
Recent writers upon business cycles differ from one another less in
principle than in emphasis. Everyone who studies the problem with
care must realize that many processes are involved in the alternations
of prosperity and depression.But each investigator decides for
himself the question: What among these many processes is the prime
mover in producing cyclical oscillations, and what processes merely
adapt themselves as best may be to changes produced elsewhere?
'Lord Overstone's statement may be quoted:
"The history of what we are in the habit of calling the 'state of trade' is an instruc-
tive lesson. We find it subject to various conditions which are periodically returning; it
revolves apparently in an established cycle.First, we find it in a state of quiescence,—
next improvement,—growrng confidence,—prosperity,—excitement,—overtrading,—con-
vulsion,—pressure,—.-stagnation,-.-distress,_-endingagaininquiescence."Reflections
suggested by a perusal of Mr. J. Horsley Palmers' pamphlet on the Causes and Conse-
quences of the Pressure on the Money Market. By Samuel Jones Loyd, London, 1837.
On the American observations, see Harry E. Miller, "Earlier Theories of Crises and
Cycles in the United States," Quarterly Journal of Economics, February, 1924, vol.
xxxviii, p. 309.
8DesCrises Commerciales, 2d ed., Paris, 1889, chapter i and passim.12 BUSINESS CYCLES
Each gives chief attention to the one or more factors which he be-
lieves to play the chief causaf role; but many writers also show how
the changes produced by their chosen causes affect other processes,
and in so doing they are likely to find use for the work of men whose
distribution of emphasis differs from their own.
Among the factors to which the leading role in causing business
cycles has been assigned by competent inquirers within the past
decade are the weather, the uncertainty which beclouds all plans that
stretch into the future, the emotional aberrations to which business
decisions are subject, the innovations characteristic of modern so-
ciety, the "progressive" character of our age, the magnitude of savings,
the construction of industrial equipment, "generalized over-produc-
tion," the operations of banks, the flow of money incomes, and the
conduct of business for profits. Each of these explanations merits at-
tention from those who seek to understand business cycles; for each
should throw light upon some feature or aspect of these complex
phenomena.
We need not, however, review the full analysis of the writers by
whose ideas we seek to profit.That would be the task of a treatise
upon theories of business cycles.This book deals with the cycles
themselves, and to it the theories are tools to be used in construc-
tive work.The following pages, therefore, aim merely to borrow
from the recent books and articles upon business cycles those sug-
gestions which promise to enlarge our understanding of the prob-
lem as a whole.
1. THE WEATHER.
Most elegant among current explanations of business cycles are
the meteorological theories.
In 1801 Sir William Herschel suggested that changes in sun-spots
may affect the weather, hence crops, and hence prices.'This idea,
coupled with Schwabe's discovery (recognized by the Royal As-
tronomical Society in 1857) that sun-spots are cyclical, fascinated
the speculative mind of W. Stanley Jevons, and led him to the hy-
pothesis that business cycles are caused by solar cycles. To test this
notion, Jevons studied the records of English trade from 1721 to
'Observations tending to investigate the nature of the Sun in order to find the
Causes or Symptoms of its variable Emission of Light and Heat; with Remarks on the
Use that may possibly be drawn from Solar Observations.Philosophical Transactions
of the Royal Society of London, 1801, vol. xci, pp. 265-318.THE PROCESSES INVOLVED IN BUSINESS CYCLES13
1878 to see how closely the two cycles agreed with each other.He
concluded that there had been 16 crises in this period of 157 years.
Thus he obtained an average length of 10.466 years for the commercial
cycle, which agreed almost exactly with the length then assigned to
the sun-spot cycle, 10.45 years.Jevons declared himself
perfectly convinced that these decennial crises do depend upon
meteorological variations of like period, which again depend,
in all probability upon cosmical variations of which we have
evidence in the frequency of sunspots, auroras, and magnetic
perturbations.2
Unfortunately for this theory, since 1878 astronomers have revised
their computations of the sun-spot cycle (the average now commonly
accepted is 11 + years),3 and commercial cycles have departed still
further from the decennial norm. Hence in 1909, Jevons' son, Pro-
fessor Herbert Stanley Jevons, suggested a modification of the solar
hypothesis.He believed that meteorologists had demonstrated the
existence of a 3½ year period in solar radiation and in barometric
pressure. By analyzing agricultural data he found evidence of a 31/2
yearperiodicity in crop yields also.Trade cycles, he held, are either
7 or 101/2 years in length. He tied these two results together by ob-
serving that a single period of good crops does not suffice to produce
an unhealthy boom in business, but that two or at most three such
periods following each other will do so.In this revised form, he
concluded that his father's meteorological theory of the business
cycle remains valid.4
Since Professor Jevons had relied largely upon American data
to establish his weather cycle of 3½ years, surprise was felt when
Professor Henry L. Moore announced in 1914 that harmonic anaiysis
of rainfall data from the grain areas of Ohio and Illinois shows the
existence of a 33-year and an 8-year cycle.His supplemental com-
putations showed high coefficients of correlation between crop yields
per acre and other indices of business conditions, such as wholesale
2Jevons'leading papers on this topic, dating from 1875 to 1882, are reprinted in his
Investigations in Currency and Finance, edited by H. S. Foxwell, London, 1884, pp. 194-
243.The passage quoted is on pp. 235, 236.Jevons' first investigation, by a different
method, will be referred to in Chapter IV, section iv, 1, below.
'Sir William H. Beveridge, "Wheat Prices and Rainfall in Western Europe," Journal
of the Royal Statistical Society, May, 1922, vol. lxxxv, pp. 434-437.
"The Causes of Unemployment: III, Trade Fluctuations and Solar Activity,"
Contemporary Review, August, 1909, vol. xcvi, pp. 165 if.Reprinted with added preface
and summary, as The Sun's Heat and Trade Activity, London, 1910.14 BUSINESS CYCLES
prices and pig-iron production.Professor Moore formulated his con-
clusions in the following "law":
The weather conditions represented by the rainfall in the cen-
tral part of the United States, and probably in other continental
areas, pass through cycles of approximately thirty-three years
and eight years in duration, causing like cycles in the yield per
acre of the crops; these cycles of crops constitute the natural,
material current which drags upon its surface the lagging,
rhythmically changing values and prices with which the econo-
mist is more immediately concerned.5
Later, Professor Moore extended his investigations to other parts
of the United States, to England and to France, finding confirmation
for his 8-year, but seemingly not for his 33-year cycle. He also sug-
gested an astronomical cause for this dominant weather cycle more
daring than the sunspot theory. At intervals of 8 years Venus comes
directly into the path of solar radiations to the earth.Its magnetic
field, thinks Professor Moore, may affect the stream of electrons
flowing from the sun and so produce an effect on earthly magnetism
and weather.6
To complete the record of divergencies among the economists who
have utilized meteorological data, it must be added that Sir William
H. Beveridge has applied harmonic analysis to European wheat prices
for the three centuries from 1545 to 1844, and found evidence that
there are, not one or two, but many cycles in the weather.Of these
cycles a few of the best accredited have lengths (1) of 5.1 and 35.5
years (shown by harmonic analysis and confirmed by independent
meteorological data), and (2) of 5.671, 9.750, 12.840, 19.900, 54.000
and possibly 68.000 years (clearly shown by harmonic analysis, but
not yet confirmed by meteorological observations).There is no 8-
year period in the cycles for which Sir William Beveridge finds the
strongest evidence.But a period of 8.050 years occurs in his third
group, for which there is "some, but not first-rate, evidence both in
wheat prices and in meteorology."
Sir William's conclusion is that,
Somewhere or other in the solar system there are periodic
movements affecting our weather and crops, 10 or 20 or more
'Economic Cycles: Their LawrndCause. New York, 1914, P. 149.
'These later investigations are summed up in Professor Moore's volume, Generating
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in number, far more regular than had ever been believed,
possibly approaching in some cases the regularity and per-
sistence of free orbital motion, subject in other cases to sudden
birth and death.These movements may be of one type, or of
several types; they may be in the sun or the planets or the
moon; in the earth or in the air or water upon its surface.7
A novel variant of the weather theories was propounded by Pro-
fessor Ellsworth Huntington in 1919.Starting to collect statistical
evidence of the effect of business conditions upon health, Huntington
convinced himself that "Health is a causefarmore than an effect" of
economic conditions.
The statistics from 1870 to the Great War show that a high
death rate regularly precedes hard times, while a low death rate
precedes prosperity.
He also found that his death-rate curve, when inverted, agreed well
with the fluctuations of school attendance one year later, New York
bank clearings three years later, wholesale prices and National Bank
deposits four years later, and immigration five years later.
Business cycles (Professor Huntington concluded) appear to
depend largely on the mental attitude of the community,
the mental attitude depends on health...andhealth
depends largely upon the weather.8
Professor Werner Sombart's theory of the dissimilarity in the
rhythm of production of organic and inorganic goods may be regarded
as a view intermediate between the preceding group of theories which
trace business cycles to physical causes and the following groups which
trace them to economic factors.He points out that the inorganic
industries, typified by the steel trade, can expand enormously within
a brief period without being seriously hampered by scarcity of raw
materials.The organic industries, typified by cotton-spinning, on
the contrary are always in precarious dependence upon the year's
harvests.In the organic industries, one may say, the condition of
business is determined largely by the yield of raw materials; in the
inorganic industries, the condition of business itself determines how
Sir William H. Beveridge, "Wheat Prices and Rainfall in Western Europe," Journal
of the Royal Stati.stical Society, May, 1922, vol. lxxxv, pp. 412-459. The quotation is
from p. 452.
8Ellsworth Huntington, World-Power and Evolution.New Haven, 1919, chapters
ii-iv. The passages cited are on pp. 29 and 42.16 BUSINESS CYCLES
much of the raw materials shall be produced.In a period of pros-
perity, the organic industries dependent upon uncertain harvests for
their supplies may be unable to keep pace with the inorganic trades,
which are being rapidly expanded by heavy investments of capital.
There results a disturbance of the proportion which must be main-
tained in the production of the two types of goods, if the current sup-
plies of both types are to find a profitable market. The modern crisis,
therefore, is at bottom the result of a clash between the workings of
physical and economic processes.°
2'. UNCERTAINTY.
Of the theories which trace business cycles to economic rather
than physical conditions, the simplest is that which develops Sis-
mondi's indictment of prices as guides to production. A fresh state-
ment of this familiar idea is given by Dr. Charles 0. Hardy of the
Institute of Economics in his book on Risk and Risk-Bearing.
The business man's "principal devices for securing a balanced out-
put," Dr. Hardy points out, "are prices and advance orders."Both
are fallible guides.
Prices and orders give information concerning the prospective
state of demand compared with the known facts of present and
future supply, but they give no clue to the changes in supply
which they are themselves likely to cause.
This situation results in "a tendency to alternations of over- and
under-production." When prices and orders indicate an expansion
of demand,
the tendency is for an increasing number of persons to try to
take advantage of the situation, each more or less in ignorance
of the other's plans, and no force intervenes to check the con-
tinued increase of production till it reflects itself in declining
orders and falling prices. By that time, however, investments
have been made, contracts let, and operations started which
will result in further augmentation of the supply.Time is
required to check this increase in the volume of production,
and during this time production outruns consumption unless
See Werner Sombart, "Die Störungen im deutsehen Wirtschaftsleben während der
Jahre 1900 if."Schrif ten. des Verei,ns für Socialpotitik, September, 1903, vol. cxiii, pp.
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consumption is stimulated by unprofitably low prices.More-
over, just as was the case on the upswing, the indications that
production is being overdone result in curtailment of operations
by independent producers in ignorance of each other's inten-
tions, and this tendency continues till output is decreased to a
rate below that which is economically justified.
Speculative purchases and sales form a quite independent cause
of cyclical fluctuations in business, reënforcing the first cause.For
the speculators must base their judgments on substantially the same
data as the producers. Hence their operations grow rapidly in pros-
perity and shrink rapidly in depression.
The effect of this tendency to mass movements of buying and
selling is greatly to accentuate the effect of the producers' un-
certainty concerning one another's plans....Foran increase
in middlemen's stocks gives the producers twiieafalse index
of the amount of production which is economically justifiable.
When the increase in buying takes place it swells the volume
of orders and creates a false appearance of expansion in the
market, and whenever the excess stock is utilized it again gives
a false indication, this time of contraction in the market.
At bottom, then, business cycles result from
uncertainty, chiefly uncertainty on the part of producers and
middlemen concerning the conditions that will prevail in the
market when they are ready to dispose of their goods.1
3. THE EMOTIONAL FACTOR IN BUSINESS DECISIONS.
Everyone recognizes the uncertainties with which business men
must contend in planning their operations; but most writers on busi-
ness cycles hold that uncertainty merely provides opportunity for
the working of other factors to which they attach greater significance.
One of these factors is the "psychological," or more accurately, the
emotional influences which warp business judgment.The best ex-
position along this line is that given by Professor A. C. Pigou of Cam-
bridge University.In his opinion "the movement of business confi-
'Charles 0. Hardy, Risk and Risk_Bearing, Chicago, 1923, chapter v. The passages
quoted are on pp. 72-75.
Dr. Hardy's exposition may be regarded as an elaborated form of "the competition
theory" set forth by Sr William H. Beveridge in Unemployment, a Problem of In-
dustry, London, 1908, 2d ed., 1910, chapter iv.18 BUSINESS CYCLES
dence" is "the dominant cause of the rhythmic fluctuations that are
experienced in industry": "optimistic error and pessimistic error,
when discovered, give birth to one another in an endless chain."
After stating the conditions which make it difficult to avoid errors
in planning production, Professor Pigou attacks the problem why the
majority of these errors run in the same direction, instead of cancelling
each other.It is at this point that his explanation diverges from the
path that contents Dr. Hardy.While the latter relies upon the
similarity of the price and order data used by producers and by specu-
lators to account for the similarity of their errors, Professor Pigou has
recourse to waves of elation and discouragement which sweep over the
business community.
Let us suppose the business world to be in a neutral po-
sition, not suffering from either type of error. On this situa-
tion there supervenes some real cause for increase in the
demand for business activity.
Then, because business men cannot foresee the results which will be
produced by their own and other men's response to the stimulus,
errors of the optimistic type will begin to be made. But why should
these errors multiply so rapidly and grow so huge?
When an error of optimism has been generated, (Pro-
fessor Pigou answers) it tends to spread and grow, as a result
of reactions between different parts of the business community.
This comes about through two principal influences.First,
experience suggests that, apart altogether from the financial
ties by which different business men are bound together, there
exists among them a certain measure of psychological inter-
dependence. A change of tone in one part of the business
world diffuses itself, in a quite unreasoning manner, over other
and wholly disconnected parts....Secondly... anerror of
optimism on the part of one group of business men itself creates
a justification for some improved expectation on the part of
other groups.
Thus the optimistic error once born grows in scope and magnitude.
But since the prosperity h as been built largely upon error, a day
of reckoning must come.This day does not dawn until after a time
long enough to construct new industrial equipment on a large scale,
to bring the products of the new equipment to market, and to find
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the past miscalculation becomes patent—patent to creditors as well
as to debtors, and the creditors apply pressure for repayment. Thus
prosperity ends in a crisis.The error of optimism dies in the crisis,
but in dying it
gives birth to an error of pessimism. This new error is born,
not an infant, but a giant; for an industrial boom has neces-
sarily been a period of strong emotional excitement, and an
excited man passes from one form of excitement to another
more rapidly than he passes to quiescence.
Under the influence of the new error, business is unduly depressed.
For a time there is relatively slow extension of facilities for produc-
tion.In consequence,
a general shortage of a number of important commodities
gradually makes itself apparent, and those persons who have
them to sell are seen to be earning a good real return.There-
upon, certain of the bolder spirits in industry see an oppor-
tunity and seize it.
Business begins to pick up slowly and gradually.
The first year or two, say, is taken up with a wholly justified
expansion.But, after the first year or two, further expansion
represents, not a correction of the past error, but the creation
of a new one.
And the new error grows until it has betrayed business men into
courses which end in a fresh crisis.'
Professor Pigou represents waves of elation and depression as
arising from changes in the business situation, changes which are
magnified into business cycles by the emotions they excite.Dr.
Maurice Beck Hexter, Director of the Federated Jewish Charities of
Boston, has thrown out the suggestion that these waves of feeling
have an origin independent of the business world.
By an elaborate statistical analysis of vital and economic data,
Dr. Hexter has reached the conclusion that
'A. C. Pigou, The Economics of Wetfare, 1st ed., London, 1920, Part vi, chapter vi.
The quotations are from pp. 833, 839, 840, 843 and 844. In companion chapters, Professor
Pigou shows how the results of the "dominant cause" are modified by other factors, such
as harvest fluctuations, and the workings of the monetary system. Professor Pigou has
dropped this discussion from his second edition, hoping to incorporate it "in the next
year or two" in "a study of industrial fluctuations." See preface of the 2d ed., 1924.20 BUSINESS CYCLES
•..fluctuationsin conceptions precede fluctuations in whole-
sale prices by about eight months; fluctuations in the birth-
rate precede fluctuations in unemployment by about seventeen
months...fluctuationsin the death-rate precede fluctua-
tions in wholesale prices about seventeen months; and
fluctuations in the death-rate precede fluctuations in unem-
ployment by about ten months.
A causal explanation of these relations is suggested by the power-
ful emotional reactions excited in men by the death of friends and
the prospect of having children.Dr. Hexter argues thus:
Business enterprise is the application of mental effort to the
transformation of our physical environment. Anything which
affects the emotions of men must necessarily affect their ability
to make decisions, anticipate decisions, or postpone decisions.
If these times of postponed decisions or accelerated judgments
or stimulated efforts are not isolated, but, on the contrary,
run in wave-like movements, we think that there may be some-
thing to (sic) the suggestion that varying birth-rates and
fluctuating death-rates can and do affect business cycles. The
errors of optimism and the errors of pessimism may be closely
connected with these variations in human emotions.It may
very well be that these waves of emotion which run through
society from time to time are very closely related to these
variations in births and deaths.2
It will be noticed that Dr. Hexter's hypothesis is related to Pro-
fessor Huntington's quite as closely as to Professor Pigou's.But
Hexter differs from Huntington in that he does not seek to connect
fluctuations in vital statistics with fluctuations in the weather.
4. INNOVATIONS, PRoMoTIoN, PROGRESS.
Professor Joseph Schumpeter of Bonn holds that to explain busi-
ness cycles by errors bred of uncertainty and nourished by mass
psychology is superficial.That errors are made, that they wax with
prosperity, and that they play a considerable role in the cycle he
admits; but, he adds, crises and depressions would continue to run
their round if miscalculation were eliminated.
The fundamental cause of business fluctuations Schumpeter finds
'Maurice B. Hexter, Social Consequences of Business Cycles. Boston and New York.
1925, Part ii.The quotations are from pp. 169, 174 and 175.THE PROCESSESINVOLVED IN BUSINESS CYCLES21
in the innovations made from time to time by the relatively small
number of exceptionally energetic business men—their practical ap-
plications of scientific discoveries and mechanical inventions, their
development of new forms of industrial and commercial organization,
their introduction of unfamiliar products, their conquests of new
markets, exploitation of new resources, shiftings of trade routes, and
the like.Changes of this sort, when made on a large scale, alter the
data on which the massofroutine business men have based their
plans.These plans doubtless involve a certain element of error; but
business innovations produce a far graver situation.
Somehow, all enterprises must adapt themselves to the novel con-
ditions now confronting them, or go to the wall.Considerable num-
bers do fail.A far larger number manage to work out new plans
based on the new data concerning prices, costs, methods and markets.
But this process of feeling out the novel conditions and making
adjustments to them takes time.While the readjusting is under
way, the making of innovations slows down; even the most restless
of enterprisers cannot get the capital and cooperation required to
carry out their schemes.This is the period of depression.It lasts
until the readjustments have gone far enough to produce a fairly
st&ble condition of affairs, stable enough to let men regain confidence
in the future.
But the very restoration of quasi-stability makes it possible for
the disturbers of the busipess peace to resume operations on a large
scale.By borrowing for their new projects the innovators raise in-
terest rates; by investing capital they raise the prices of industrial
equipment and increase payroll disbursements.There follows an
increase of demand and a rise in the prices of consumers' goods. The
general activity thus initiated brings prosperity to the mass of en-
terprises—and stimulates further innovations.Prosperity continues
until the unsettling consequences of the business changes begin to
appear em masse in the shape of large supplies flooding the market,
high costs of materials and labor, shifting of demand to new products,
the supersession of old sources of production by new sources, and
so on.Then comes a new crisis and a new period of readjustments.
To complete this theory it is necessary to show why innovations
themselves come in waves.Schumpeter explains that the combina-
tion of capacities required for conceiving new undertakings and carry-
ing them through all obstacles and hazards is rare among men; but
that when a few highly endowed individuals have achieved success,22 BUSINESS CYCLES
their example makes the way easier for a crowd of imitators.The
rising prices, the increasing demand, the spread of optimism make
borrowers more eager and lenders less cautious.Men who do not
have the capacity to originate new schemes may have the wit to
profit by and even improve upon the work of the pioneers.So, once
started, a wave of innovation gains momentum—until it is checked
by the consequences which it produces.'
The "promotion theory" of business cycles, developed by Pro-
fessor Minnie T. England of the University of Nebraska, rests upon
the same foundations as Schumpeter's theory of innovations. While
less complete in its formal logic, Mrs. England's exposition runs in
more realistic terms and cites more evidence.It should be studied
by those who feel that Schumpeter's sketch lacks substance.2
While Mrs. England represents promoters and Professor Schum-
peter represents a less specialized group of innovators as responsible
for business crises, Dr. Emanuel H. Vogel, late of Vienna University,
lays the responsibility upon "progress" at large.
In his eyes, crises are accidents which are bound to happen every
now and then in a growing society based on private enterprise.For
when such a society is expanding year after year, prosperity requires
the maintenance of an economic equilibrium which is itself moving.
The rates at which the important industries are growing must be
kept in adjustment to each other; so also must the rates at which the
incomes of all classes of the people and their consumption of goods
are growing.
Such a consummation of adjustment, Dr. Vogel argues, is think-
able only in a society whose changes are always in the same direction
and at the same pace.It is not thinkable in a society whose fortunes
are represented by an ascending saw-toothed curve. We know that
expansion at a constant rate never continues unbroken long at a
Dr. Schumpeter's first version of this theory was published in May, 1910: "Ueber
das Wesen der Wirtschaftskrisen," Zeitschrift für Volkswirtschaft, Sozialpoiitik und
Verwaltung, vol. xix, p. 271.Successive revisions appear in his Theorie der wirisehaf t-
lichenEntwicklung, Leipzig, 1912, chapter vi; "Die Wellenbewegung des Wirtschafts-
lebens," Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, July, 1914, vol. xxxix, pp. 1-32,
and in the second edition of his Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entviicklung, Munich and
Leipzig, 1926, chapter vi.This latest version includes replies to several critics of the
theory, and is written in the most emphatic tone.
2 "Fisher'sTheory of Crises," Quarterly Journal of Economics, November, 1912,
vol. xxvii, pp. 95-106; "Promotion as the Cause of Crises," the same, August, 1915, vol.
xxix, pp. 631-641; "Economic Crises," Journal of Political Economy, April, 1913, vol. xxi.
pp. 345-354; "An Analysis of the Crisis Cycle," the same, October, 1913, vol. xxij PP.
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time; every community experiences setbacks which check its economic
progress.Unfavorable political events, mistaken forecasts of the
future, the disturbances caused by improvements in technical meth-
ods, discoveries of new sources of supply, alterations in consumers'
tastes, suggest how various are the factors which are changing the
pace of growth and occasionally causing shrinkage.
Irregularities of change, then, are rooted deep in modern economic
organization. And to these irregularities it is quite impossible that
all the different rates of growth should adjust themselves promptly
and in such a way as to maintain among themselves a moving
equilibrium. A serious rupture of equilibrium produces an economic
crisis followed by a period of declining activity.Gradually men work
out a fresh series of adjustments, equilibrium is re-established, and
progress resumes its course until something new happens to which
the rates of growth cannot adjust themselves without losing adjust-
ment to each other.3
5. THE PROCESSES OF SAvING AND INVESTING.
One of the explanations of crises most in favor among business
men is that they are caused by "scarcity of capital."Investments
during prosperity are so heavy that the supply of loan funds is grad-
ually exhausted. When this stage is reached, borrowers are unable
to complete their financing and the boom ends in a crisis.This
idea has been elaborated by Professor Michel Tugan-Baranovski,
whose Russian treatise of 1894 has been repeatedly revised and trans-
lated into French and German.
It is necessary to distinguish, Tugan-Baranovski begins, between
loan funds and capital invested in production.The loan fund is
the aggregate of savings made by individuals belonging to all classes,
and by business enterprises.During depressions the savings of busi-
ness enterprises, business men, stockholders and wage-earners decline.
But there is an important class of savers whose incomes are little
affected by depression—landlords, bond-holders, salaried officials; in-
deed their savings are augmented by the lower cost of living.Thus
saving continues on a large scale during depression, and (the vital
point) if the aggregate declines below the records of prosperity, it
certainly declines less than does investing.Hence depression brings
'Die Theorie dez volksv,irtschaftlichen Entwicketunqsprozesses und das Krisenprob-
lem. By Dr.EmanuelHugo Vogel. Vienna and Leipzig, 1917.24 BUSINESS CYCLES
the gradual accumulation of a huge uninvested fund of loan capital.
Evidence of this accumulation appears in the swollen bank reserves
and in the low rates of interest and bank discount.
Of course, the reason why these savings 'are not invested as they
are made is found in the disorganized state of business. Few business
men wish to borrow on a large scale during depression.But let
savers become eager enough to get their funds into profitable use,
let the rates of interest which they will accept drop low enough, the
dam behind which the loan fund has been accumulating will give way,
and money will begin to flow into investment.
When this time comes the huge purchases made with borrowed
loan funds bring prosperity.Stimulated by its own effects, invest-
ment keeps expanding and presently attains a scale so large as to
exceed current savings.Hence the uninvested loan fund is grad-
ually exhausted. When the point of exhaustion is neared, available
capital becomes so scarce that pending plans for further business ex-
tensions cannot be financed.Interest rates rise to prohibitive levels,
bank reserves drop to the danger point, the makers of industrial
equipment get no new orders, and prosperity ends in a crisis.'
While giving the preceding account of the process by which crises
are bred periodically, Tugan-Baranovski holds that the alternate
accumulation and exhaustion of the loan fund could not occur were
income more evenly distributed.
It is the inadequate remuneration of labor...whichis the
fundamental cause of the rapid accumulation of social capital,
which in its turn provokes crises.2
This is the idea which an English publicist, Mr. John A. Hobson, has
developed into the theory that business cycles are due to "over-saving"
—a theory quite different from Tugan-Baranovski's.
Mr. Hobson holds that at any given time
there is an exact proportion of the current income which, in
accordance with existing arts of production and existing fore-
sight, is required to set up new capital so as to make provision
for the maximum consumption throughout the near future.
'The latest exposition known to me is the French edition of Tugan-Baranovski's
treatise, Les Crises lndustrielfes em Angleterre, traduit par Josph Schapiro (Biblio-
thèque Internationale d'Economie Politique), Paris, 1913.See especially Part II.
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If in a period of prosperity, the rate of consumption should rise pan
passu with the rate of production, there is no inherent reason why
the prosperity might not continue indefinitely.But in modern so-
cieties, a large portion of the wealth produced belongs to a small class.
In active times their incomes rise more rapidly than their consump-
tion, and the surplus income is perforce saved.There results for the
community as a whole a slight deficiency of spending and a corre-
sponding excess of saving. The wealthy class seeks to invest its new
savings in productive enterprises—thereby increasing the supply of
goods and also increasing the incomes from which further savings
will be made.This process runs cumulatively during the years of
prosperity until finally the markets become congested with goods
which cannot be sold at a profit. Then prices fall, liquidation ensues,
capital is written down, and the incomes of the wealthy class are so
reduced that savings fall below the proper proportion to spending.
During the period of depression, the glut of goods weighing upon
the market is gradually worked off and the prospect of profitable in-
vestment slowly returns.Savings rise again to the right proportion
to spending and good times prevail for a season.But after a while
the chronic impulse toward over-saving becomes fully operative once
more; soon or late it begets another congestion of the markets, and
this congestion begets another depression.
Proximately then, the cause of alternating prosperity and depres-
sion is the tendency toward over-saving; ultimately it is the existence
of the surplus incomes which lead to over-saving.1
3Mr. Hobson has presented his theory in several books, but most fully in The In-
dustrial System, London, 1909, chapters iii and xviii, and in Economics of Unemploy-
ment, London, 1922. The passage quoted is from p. 53 of the earlier volume.
Another form of the savings theory is presented by Mr. N. Johannsen. The act of
saving by itself, means the withdrawal of purchasing power from the market, and so
always tends to produce business depression.But when the sums saved are promptly
invested "in the creation of new productive capital," the deficiency of purchasing
power is offset, and the community's wealth is increased. No such offsetting occurs,
however, when savings are used to buy property from embarrassed owners, or loaned
to people in distress.Those who get the money expend it; but their expenditures
merely offset their own losses, and the withdrawal of purchasing power caused br
the act of saving is not compensated for.Whether saving tends to sustain prospenty
or to cause depression thus "depends upon the manner of investment." "Impair sav-
ings," as Mr. Johannsen calls savings which are not used to create new capital, "always
hurt business, and if sufficiently large, thcy cause a general depression." See N. Johann-
sen, A Neglected Point in Connection with Crises, New York, 1908, and BusinessDe-
pressions: Their Cause. A Discovery in Economics, Stapleton, New York, 1925.
Dr. Rudolf Stucken of the University of Kiel argues in a somewhat similar vein
that, if a period of expansion in business activity is checked for any reason, savings
will not be invested in productive enterprises, but used to repay bank loans.The
immediate result is to reduce the purchasing power offered for goods below the current
supply seeking sale, and so to convert the check upon expansion into a contraction.26 BUSINESS CYCLES
6. CONSTRUCTION Wont.
Among the numerous theorists who have been influenced by
Tugan-Baranovski are writers who have sought to show what his
But the reduction of bank loans, and the concomitant reduction of demand liabilities
enables the banks to increase their credit advances to business men liberally 'when a
revival begins, and thus to convert revival into prosperity.See Rudolf Stucken,
Theorie der Konjunkturschwankunien, Jena, 1926.
While Mr. D. H. Robertson cannot be classified with the savings theorists, since
be believes that other factors have a leading share in producing cyclical oscillations in
trade, the most notable feature of his recent book on Banking Policy and the Price
Level, (London, 1926), is an analysis of the role played by savings in "trade cycles."
For this analysis he invents a curious terminology.
"The essence of the activity of providing capital" is "Lacking." "A man
is lacking if during a given period he consumes less than the value of his
current economic output.... Theamount of Lacking done in a given
period may be measured by the volume of consumable goods lacked.
The things in the provision of which Lacking eventuates I propose to call
Capital. ... LongLacking is directed towards providing society with the
use ... ofthe fixed and durable instruments of production: Short Lacking
towards" providing society with the use of circulating capital, which, like
fixed capital, consists of commodities.(Pp. 40-42.)
Equipped with these definitions, Mr. Robertson argues:
"From our present point of view, the fundamental feature of the upward
swing of a trade cycle is a large and discontinuous increase in the demand
for Short Lacking, occurring as the essential preliminary to an expansion
of output ... thesupply of (Spontaneous) Short Lacking is not sufficiently
elastic to cope with such pronounced and discontinuous increases in den' and,
and ...theresponsibility for meeting them rests almost entirely upon
the banking-system (Pp. 71, 72)... Nowthe banking-system can, of
course, only 'provide'... ShortLacking ... byextorting it from the
general public through the multiplication of currency."(Pp. 88, 89.)
The meaning seems to be that current output cannot be expanded freely in a
period of prosperity unless there has been an increase in the commodities which
constitute circulating capital; that these commodities cannot be provided in sufficient
quantity unless the general public is prevented from increasing its consumption as fast
as output rises, and that the banks put the necessary brake upon consumption by rais-
ing prices through an increase of the currency.
Mr. Robertson holds that most periods of prosperity bring also a rapid increase
in the demand for fixed capital, and therefore for the Long Lacking which provides it.
Part of this demand is met by investors, but part falls on the banks.The latter
can provide Long Lacking only by the means which they use to provide Short Lacking,
that is, they must extort Long Lacking from the public by expanding the currency
and raising prices.(Pp. 84-89).
But the rise of prices through which the banks extort Lacking, Short and Long, from
the public increases the money value of the circulating and fixed capital required by
business enterprises, and therefore makes necessary a greater rise of prices.Obviously
a self-inflating process of this sort cannot be sustained indefinitely. To keep the process
under control, the banks raise interest rates, sell government securities, and, at need,
limit new money loans.Despite the skill which modern banking-systems have ac-
quired in promoting equilibrium between tb demand for and supply of Lacking,
many crises are still characterized by what is popularly called "an acute shortage
of capital," and what is properly called "a deficiency in the activity Lacking."(Pp.
79, 90).
I offer this interpretation of Mr. Robertson's analysis with a diffidence which
readers of his book will understand.It is certainly incomplete; I hope it is not wrong.THE PROCESSES INVOLVED IN BUSINESS CYCLES 27
analysis of savings means in terms of production. By so doing they
have shifted the emphasis from over-saving to over-production of
one type of goods in comparison with another type.This variant of
business-cycle theory is represented in Germany by Professor Arthur
Spiethoff of the University of Berlin;' but it will suffice to cite the
less technical exposition given by Mr. George H. Hull, an American
business man.
High prices of construction, runs Hull's thesis, is the hitherto
"unknown cause of the mysterious depressions" from which the in-
dustrial nations suffer.The greater part of modern trade fluctuates
within relatively narrow limits.Agriculture provides the necessities
of life, commerce distributes them, and finance adjusts the bills. The
volume of all this business is fairly constant, because the demand for
necessities is incapable of sudden expansion or contraction.Inclus-
try, on the contrary, may expand or contract indefinitely, especially
that part of industry devoted to construction work.For the sources
of booms and depressions, therefore, we must look to the enterprises
which build and equip houses, stores, factories, railways, docks, and
the like.
Of the huge total of construction, which Mr. Hull believes to make
"say 77 per cent of all industrial products of the nation" after "de-
ducting land and the necessities of life," about two-thirds, even in
the busiest of years, consists of repairs, replacements, and such ex-
tensions as are required by the growth of population.This portion
of construction is necessary and must be executed every year.But
the remaining portion is "optional construction," and is undertaken
or not according as investors see a liberal or a meager profit in pro-
viding new building and equipment.
When the costs of construction fall low enough to arouse "the
bargain-counter instinct," many of the "far-seeing ones who hold
the purse-strings of the country" let heavy contracts, and their ex-
ample is followed by the less shrewd. The addition of this new busi-
ness to the volume of "necessity construction" and the provision of
consumers' goods, creates a boom.But, after a year or two, con-
Professor Spiethoff published his analysis in a series of articles in Schmoller's
Jahrbuch fur Gesetzgebung, 1902, pp. 721-759; 1903, pp. 670-708; 1909, pp. 445-467, 927-
951, 1417-1437.See also Spiethoff's article "Krisen" in the 4th edition of the Hand-
wörterbuch der Staatswissen.schaften, Jena, 1925, vol. vi, pp. 8-91.Mr. Dennis H.
Robertson has developed a theory of "constructional relapse" which runs on similar
lines.See A Study of IndustriaL Fluctuation, London, 1915, pp. 170-198.
A summary of Spiethoff's theory may be found in the earlier edition of this book,
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tractors discover that their order books call for more work than
they can get labor and materials to finish within the contract time.
When this oversold condition of the contracting trades is realized,
the prices of labor and raw materials rise rapidly. The estimated cost
of construction on new contracts then becomes excessive.Shrewd
investors therefore begin to postpone the execution of their plans for
extending permanent equipment, and the letting of fresh contracts
declines apace. While the contractors are gradually completing work
on their old orders, all the enterprises making iron, steel, lumber,
cement, brick, stone, etc., begin to suffer a serious shrinkage of new
business.Just as the execution of the large contracts for "optional
construction," let in the low-price period, brought on prosperity, so
the smallness of such contracts, let in the high-price period, now brings
on depression.Then the costs of construction work fall until they
arouse "the bargain-counter instinct" of investors once more, and
the cycle begins afresh.2
Colonel Malcolm C. Rorty has suggested that the over-construc-
tion theory should be expanded into an "over-commitment" theory,
and strengthened by analysis of financial processes.At an early
stage in many periods of prosperity, he points out, simultaneous over-
commitments to business extensions and new ventures are made in
most, if not in all, branches of industry.Each such commitment in-
volves the creation, through credit extensions, of new purchasing
power.Since the additional purchasing power is not offset promptly
by a corresponding increase in production, prices rise.This process
of extending commitments, expanding credit and raising prices con-
tinues until it is checked by shortage of credit facilities, or until prices
have reached a level at which experienced business men see danger
in making further additions to their stocks of goods.Then comes a
contraction of purchases, and a crisis.
Such are the essential features of a typical boom and crisis, arising
from causes inherent in the business organization. But Colonel Rorty
adds that we have cycles of two other types. The milder periods of
prosperity and recession arise from mere current readjustments of
production, distribution and consumption.Still other cycles arise
primarily from non-business causes, such as wars.Admitting that
sometimes it is difficult to decide to which of these three types a
2GeorgeH. Hull, Indu.9trial Depression8, New York, 1911.The passages quoted are
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given casebelongs,Colonel Rorty holds that this classification clarifies
the problem, and explains why no one theory accounts in satisfactory
fashion for all cycles.3
7. GENERALIZED OVER-PRODUCTION.
The emphasis which Spiethoff and Hull put upon the difference be-
tween the roles played by industrial equipment and consumers' goods
in business cycles has become a commonplace in later writings. Two
theorists in particular have developed this idea, and in developing
it have reached results which differ sharply from those of Tugan-
Baranovski and Hull.Against the first they contend that there
is and can be no accumulation of uninvested loan-capital; against
the second they contend that crises result from a general, not
a partial over-production of goods, and that the seat of difficulty is
in the industries making consumers' goods rather than in those making
industrial equipment.Mentor Bouniatian, professor at the Poly-
technic Institute of Tiflis was perhaps the earlier to publish; but the
clearer exposition has been supplied by Albert Aftalion, professor at
the University of Paris.1
When the price level rises after a period of depression—why it
should rise will appear later—business men see that current demand
for consumers' goods is larger than current supply at the old prices.
To secure their shares of the good profits in prospect, manufacturers
enlarge the volume of their orders for industrial equipment; These
orders increase employment, thus stimulate consumers' demand, and
so encourage the placing of still larger orders for equipment.
To construct the equipment which is typical of modern industry,
however, requires months and often years. Hence a considerable time
must pass before notable additions can be made to the current supply
'See M. C. Rorty, Some Problems in Current Economics, Chicago, 1922, pp. 73-84,
andthe report of Colonel Rorty's address to the National Founders Association, in
The Iron Age, November 25, 1926, pp. 1478-1482.
On the relations between the ideas of these two writers see the preface of Las
Crises Economiques, par Mentor Bouniatian, Traduit du Russe, (Moscow, 1915) par
J. Bernard (Bsbliothèque Internationale d'Economie Politique), Paris, 1922.Bounia-
tian's first book on the subject was Wirtschaftskrisen und Ueberkapitalisation, Munich,
1908.Aftahon published first a series of articles on "La réalite des surproductions gén-
érales" in the Revue d'Economie Pol.itique, 1908-09 (vol. xxii, pp. 696-706; vol. xxiii,
pp. 81-117, 201-229, 241-259); then an Essai d'une théorie des crises générates et pdrio-
diques, Paris, 1909, and finally a treatise, Las Crises périodiques de Surproduction,
2 vole., Paris, 1913.30 BUSINESS CYCLES
of consumers' goods. During this "period of gestation," 2thesupply
of consumers' goods continues inadequate, prices keep advancing,
employment grows fuller, large incomes are disbursed and prosperity
reigns.
After prosperity has grown at an increasing pace for some time,
however, large quantities of new equipment are ready for use and
the current supply of consumers' goods is augmented. Then trouble
begins.For, according to "the laws of value," these increments added
to the supply of consumers' goods cannot be sold at prices such as
have recently prevailed. When the supply of any commodity in-
creases, the wants satisfied by consuming new increments are less
intense than the marginal wants recently satisfied.The later days
of prosperity are therefore characterized by a decline in the marginal
utility of consumers' goods.This decline brings with it a reduction
in the prices consumers are willing to pay—a fall which is rendered
greater by the concomitant rise in the marginal utility of money,
caused by the increasing demands upon the circulating medium made
by active trade.Presently it becomes clear that general over-produc-
tion prevails.The fall of prices extends from one field to another
and prosperity ends in a crisis.
General over-production accompanied by a declining price level
lasts for a year or so after the crisis, because the new equipment has
cost so much money that it must be kept running, if that is anywise
possible.Indeed, over-production increases for a time, since part of
the equipment ordered in the latter part of the boom is not finished
until after the crisis, and when it is delivered it must be made to
give some return upon the capital locked up in it.The fall of prices
is now opposed by a decline in the marginal utility of money, which
is less needed in depression; but the decline in the marginal utility
of consumers' goods more than offsets this factor.
Recovery from depression comes after three or four years, be-
cause, while prices are falling, there is little inducement to order new
equipment.It is true that some new orders are placed even in the
2 phraseis borrowed from Mr. D. H. Robertson, who has developed this point
more fully than Aftaliori or Bouniatian.In particular Mr. Robertson suggests that the
recurrence of business cycles may be due in large part to the more or less simultaneous
wearing-out and re-ordering of large masses of equipment made in an earlier period of
prosperity.See A Study of Industrial Fluctuation, pp. 13-25, London, 1915.
Professor Pigou, who also makes much of the "period of gestation," ventures the
statement that "ten years seem to be, not merely the average, but also the markedly
predominant" length of life of machinery. The Economics of Welfare, 1st ed., pp. 827-
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worst of times; but the volume shrinks greatly in comparison with
that of the preceding period of prosperity.Meanwhile the demand
for consumers' goods continues to grow, though at a slightly slower
pace than in prosperity.Let this situation persist for a few years,
and gradually the current demand for consumers' goods at the low
prices which depression causes will come to exceed current supply.
When this happens, prices turn upward again.Then business men
seek to increase their output and begin ordering equipment more
freely.But while their orders are being executed, the current supply
of consumers' goods becomes scantier in comparison with the growing
demand, prices rise further, and another period of prosperity dawns.
8. BANKING OPERATIONS.
All the explanations summarized in the preceding sections take
for granted that the processes which they trace run in communities
equipped with modern monetary and banking systems.From their
viewpoints, however, money and bank credit are simply mechanisms
through which the economic forces causing business cycles work
their effects.At most these theories admit that the monetary
mechanism accentuates the wave movements which are started by
more fundamental factors.'The explanations which make business
cycles a direct consequence of banking operations therefore consti-
tute a distinct variety of cycle theories.
No one has contented himself with a briefer statement of the
reason for adopting this type of explanation than Professor Alvin H.
Hansen of the University of Minnesota.
Demand, (he argues), is based on purchasing power.The
source of purchasing power is income, and the source of income
is the production of material goods and services....Inshort,
goods and services are exchanged against goods and services.
On this basis one would expect production to run an even
course, and not to run in cycles.And indeed in the barter
economy there were no business cycles.
But how does the rise of money economy produce cyclical oscilla-
tions?Under modern conditions, Professor Hansen answers,
'See, for example, Professor Pigou's chapter on "Accentuation of Wave Movements
due to the Working of the Monetary System"The Economics of Welfare, 1st ed.,
pp. 849-864, and Mr. Robertson's chapter on "The Wage and Money Systems," A Study
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The nominal purchasing power obtaining in any society at
any given moment may be measured substantially by the
amount of money in hand-to-hand circulation and the volume
of bank credit in the form of deposit currency.
The amount of purchasing power, and therefore of demand, made
available by the banks is limited
by two things: first, by the quantity of reserves; second, by
the desirability of converting personal credit into bank credit,
and this depends upon the discount rate and the profitableness
of the employment of capital in industry.
Plainly neither these limits themselves nor the closeness with which
they are approached is fixed; hence the purchasing power which
the banks provide can fluctuate through a wide range.
When the banks increase nominal purchasing power by granting
more credit, they add to the circulating media.
The effect is an increase in. prices and therefore no increase in
real purchasing power. The nominal incomes of people gen-
erally are as before, but their real purchasing power is reduced
because of the increase in prices. The issuance of bank credit
simply redistributes purchasing power, reducing the real pur-
chasing power of income receivers generally, and increasing
the purchasing power of entrepreneurs able to secure bank
credit.It is this redistribution of purchasing power, accom-
plished through the instrumentality of banking institutions,
that changes demand, upsets prices, affects the profit margin,
and therefore production.Here, in short, may be found the
fundamental cause of the business cycle.
To complete the theory, it is necessary to follow the round of
events:
When accumulated stocks have run out, when costs are fall-
ing, when labor is easily obtainable, when loanable funds are
plentiful and interest rates run low, then prospects for profit-
making are bright and entrepreneurs apply for bank credit.
The issuance of bank credit increases the purchasing power
of entrepreneurs. The result is increased bidding for raw ma-
terials, capital equipment, construction work, etc., with a
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The business men, who profit by the increased demand, in their turn
apply for bank loans and so the process runs expansively for a time.
"This upward movement comes to a close only when bank credit
can no longer be further extended, for the reason that it has already
reached the limit of banking safety."But this limit can hardly be
reached without being overrun; for the activity of trade causes more
money to be drawn into hand-to-hand circulation, at the expense of
bank reserves."It therefore becomes necessary not merely to stop
the expansion of bank credit, but actually to reduce the outstanding
volume."The resulting contraction causes prices to fall, the volume
of business to shrink, and the demand for bank credit itself to slacken
—once more a self-propagating process.
But as the upward movement culminated because of the strain
placed upon bank reserves through an undue extension of
bank credit, so the downward movement comes to a close be-
cause of the great accumulation of bank reserves due to the
reduction of outstanding bank credit and the return of money
from hand-to-hand circulation following the decline of prices.
This continued accumulation of reserves leads bankers pro-
gressively to lower discount rates to a point low enough to
make the employment of bank credit again profitable. New
securities are freely issued, bank loans are readily obtainable,
and the purchasing power of business enterprises increases.
Thus the upward swing returns and the cycle repeats itself.2
Like Professor Hansen, Mr. R. G. Hawtrey of the British Treasury
thinks he has "proved that there is an inherent tendency toward
fluctuations in the banking institutions which prevail in the world
as it is."But Hawtrey lays more stress than Hansen upon the im-
portance of changes in discount rates.
"An expansion of trade occurs," Mr. Hawtrey explains, "when the
amount of credit money in existence is less than the bankers think
prudent, having regard to their holdings of cash, and they lower the
rate of interest in order to encourage borrowing."This reduction in
the cost of loans starts a long train of consequences: dealers give
larger orders to producers, producers increase output and raise prices,
employment becomes fuller and wages rise, the increase of incomes
augments retail demand, the prosperous business classes borrow more
'Cycles of Prosperity and Depression in the United States, Great Britain and Ger-
many, by Alvin H. Hansen (University of Wisconsin Studies in the Social Sciences and
History, No. 5).Madison, 1921. The quotations are from pp. 104.108.34 BUSINESS CYCLES
freely—and so on progressively, until the banks, having lent all the
credit they think prudent,
no longer need to keep down the rate of interest.The rate of
interest is then raised to the "profit rate," and the inducement
(for dealers) to increase stocks of goods is removed.
Trade expansion is followed by trade depression, because the high
rates of interest tempt the banks to lend as much as possible.For
a time they can expand loans without losing much cash; but when
the lagging rise of wage rates gets under way, bank reserves are
reduced.Further, high prices are likely to stimulate imports, check
exports and so cause an outflow of gold from the country enjoying
prosperity. When their reserves decline appreciably, the banks are
forced to contract outstanding loans.For this purpose they raise
the rate of interest still further and withdraw funds loaned on the
investment market. Then securities fall and dealers in commodities
seek to reduce stocks on which the carrying charge has become heavy.
They give fewer orders to producers, producers decrease output and
cut down their working forces; retail demand falls off; stocks threaten
to become redundant again because of fewer sales, and the process
starts all over again.During this period of depression business men
need less credit and the reduced wage disbursements allow cash to
accumulate in the banks. Thus the banks win back to an easy con-
dition, and "no longer need to keep up the rate of interest." By the
fall in interest rates the way is prepared for a new expansion of
trade.3
'and Bad Trade. An Inquiry into the Causes of Trade Fluctuations, by R. G.
Hawtrey, London, 1913.The quotations are from pp. 3, 199, 268 and 269.
In a later volume, Mr. Hawtrey seems to have changed his fundamental thesis
somewhat."Far from causing the cyclical fluctuations," he says on p. 425 of Currency
and Credit (2d ccl., London, 1923), "a banking system diminishes their violence and
facilitates their control." The "instability of credit" is due "not so much to the banker
as to the merchant and the promoter."(p. 423).But he adds, "though credit institu-
tions are not themselves the cause of this phenomenon, yet where such institutions exist
it is through them that the fluctuations take effect."(p. 425).For present purposes,
it is Mr. Hawtrey's analysis of the process by which cyclical fluctuations come to pass in
modern communities, rather than his brief discussion of their causes, which is helpful.
To this analysis lie adheres in Currency and Credit (see p. 130 and chapters ix, x), with
minor modifications, of which I have incorporated the most important into my sum-
mary made from his Good and Bad Trade.
Mr. Hawtrey's theory has much in common with views formerly held by Professor
Irving Fisher.But there is a significant difference.Professor Fisher built upon what
he believed to be a statistically demonstrated fact that changes in interest rates lag
behind price movements.This lag increases the profits of business borrowers when
prices are rising and stimulates activity. When prices are falling, the lagging Of interest
rates reduces profits and augments depression. Mr. Hawtrey, on the other hand, repre-THE PROCESSES INVOLVED IN BUSINESS CYCLES 35
9. Pnoruc'rio AND THE FLOWOFMONEY INCOMES.
In a sense, all of the theories so far reviewed are ways of explain-
ing why the people of a country sometimes cannot or will not buy at
profitable prices all they produce; or, what comes to the same thing,
why they produce more than they can sell.But the most direct
way of solving the problem when stated in this way has still to be
noticed.It consists in giving new reasons for Sismondi's contention
that in periods of activity money incomes lag behind the money value
of the goods produced.
The suggestion of Mr. R. E. May introduces the subtle recent
theories which follow this line. May builds upon two corner stones:
(1) in a modern industrial community wages form by far the largest
of the income streams, (2) wages increase less rapidly in prosperity
than the aggregate value of goods produced.Thus the purchasing
power of the most important class of consumers fails to keep pace
with the volume of goods seeking sale.Let the resulting excess of
dollar supply over dollar demand accumulate for a year or two,
and it is inevitable that the market for consumers' goods will be
glutted.Then come a crisis and depression which restore the body
economic to health, by forcing down prices to the point where the
wage-earning consumers can buy what is offered.And Mr. May
seats changes in bank-discount rates as themselves the active force in initiating trade
fluctuations, with their concomitant price fluctuations.
For Professor Fisher's theory, see The Purchasing Power of Money, New York, 1911,
chapters iv and xi, sections 15-17; and "Gold Depreciation and Interest Rates," Moody's
Magazine, 1909, pp. 110-114 (a summary statement). As late as December, 1923, Fisher
still suspected "that the principal force affecting the cycle is the real rate of interest,
the sum of the money rate of interest and the rate of appreciation (positive or nega-
tive) of the purchasing power of the dollar."(See "The Business Cycle Largely a 'Dance
of the Dollar'," Journal of the American Statistical Association, vol. xviii, p. 1024).
Recently, however, Professor Fisher has come to believe that "the" business cycle is a
myth.Fluctuations in "trade," (which remain genuine in his eyes), are due primarily
to "price-change"; but the next most important influence "is probably that of the rate
of interest."See "Our Unstable Dollar and the So-called Business Cycle," Journal of
the American Stati,stical Association, June, 1925, vol. xx, pp. 191, 198.
Professor Wilhelm Ropke of Jena has suggested an interesting combination of the
savings and the banking theories of business cycles.The "real cyclical bacillus" he
finds in periodic variations in the ratio between accumulation and consumption, which
cannot be altered much without producing serious disturbances in the process of ex-
change. But these periodic variations in the ratio between accumulation and consump-
tion are due in large part to periodic changes in the volume of credit—changes which
appear in discrepancies between the real and the nominal rates of interest, in the
liquidity of the credit-granting banks, and in their operating policies.See his paper on
"Kredit und Konjunktur," in Jahrbucher für Nationa(äkonomie ui-id Statistik, March-
April, 1926, vol. cxxiv, pp. 243-285.36 BUSINESS CYCLES
follows the logic of his diagnosis to the point of recommending a legal
limitation of profits, in order that producers may be forced to reduce
selling prices as they increase output.'
A more adequate development of this theme has been provided
by Professor Emil Lederer of Heidelberg.
Depression is characterized, he begins, by a decline in physical
production and in prices.Though general, the price decline is not
uniform. The prices which constitute the incomes of the propertied
and salaried classes shrink but little.Nor do wage cuts and unem-
ployment reduce the money incomes of the working masses so much
as the cost of living falls.Farmers, also, as a rule lose less than they
gain by the price movements. Thus, the discrepancies characteristic
of the decline in prices enable consumers to buy perhaps a larger
physical quantity of commodities, certainly a larger quota of the cur-
rent output.Business profits, on the other hand, fall heavily, just
because wages, rent and interest charges lag behind the decline of
selling prices.The unprofitableness of business,, and the consequent
reduction of savings check the expansion of industrial equipment.
But the increasing purchasing power of the majority of income re-
ceivers gradually absorbs whatever stocks of consumers' goods were
carried over from the prosperous phase of the cycle in addition to
the reduced current output, and so produces a condition which favors
a resumption of activity.
A business revival, as it gets under way, reverses the trend of
prices.Rising prices and the growing volume of trade call for larger
payments.To a limited extent, the increase in payments can be
effected by quickening the circulation of money and credit, which
had become sluggish during depression.Further expansion may be
provided for by additions to the gold supply.Seldom, however, are
these resources adequate to the need.Broadly speaking, periods of
prosperity are made possible only by "additional credit"—that is,
purchasing power, provided chiefly by banks, which is not based upon
previous production.
Supported by "additional credit," the advance of prices gains
momentum as activity waxes.But the advance is no less unequal
than the decline had been. The prices which make up the incomes
of the propertied, the salaried, and the wage-earning classes lag
1R. E. May, DasGrundqesetzder Wirtchaftskrisen undihrVorbeugen.siniUel im
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behind the prices of commodities. Hence the buying power of these
classes is reduced, or, at least, fails to keep pace with the expansion
of output.Meanwhile the lagging of those prices which constitute
costs to business enterprises behind the prices which constitute re-
ceipts is enhancing profits.Larger profits lead to larger savings,
larger investments in industrial equipment, and, when this equipment
is ready for use, to larger supplies of consumers' goods, for which the
demand is growing less rapidly, if not actually shrinking.Under
such circumstances a crisis is inevitable, and a crisis reverses the trend
of prices once more, starting the processes with which the analysis
began.
According to Lederer, then, the most important cause of business
cycles lies in the inequalities characteristic of price movements—in-
equalities which alter the distribution of purchasing power among
income classes, the demand for different types of products, the rate
at which industrial equipment grows, and the trend of price move-
ments themselves."Disproportionality of production" is as char-
acteristic of business fluctuations as "disproportionality of income";
but the two developments have quite different effects.Over-produc
tion of certain goods in comparison with others leads to price changes,
which affect profits, force alterations in production schedules, and
so restore proper balance."Disproportionality of incomes" is not self-
rectifying; its consequences cumulate until they reach the critical
point at which they convert depression into prosperity, or prosperity
into depression.2
Like Professor Leclerer, Messrs. Catchings, Foster and Hastings
of the Pollak Foundation for Economic Research hold that prosperity
is checked by the failure of consumers' incomes to keep pace with the
output of consumers' goods.But the Pollak group give an explana-
tion of this deficiency of consumer buying which differs from Lederer's
theory of the inequalities in the rates at which different prices
advance.
To keep business active, the Pollak theory begins, consumers must
receive and spend incomes equal to the full value, at current retail
prices, of the consumers' goods sent to market. Were industry con-
fined to providing consumers' goods, this requirement would mean
(1) that the total selling value of all products must be paid out
'Emil Lederer, "Konjunktur mid Krisen," Grundriss der Sozialökonomik, Part iv,
Section i, Tilbingen, 1925, pp. 354-413.38 BUSINESS CYCLES
promptly by business enterprises as costs (that is, as wages, salaries.
rent, interest, taxes, etc.) or as dividends; (2) that all the money
received by individuals must be paid back promptly to business enter-
prises for their products.
In the real world, of course, many business enterprises make goods
which are not offered to consumers, and in so doing disburse incomes
to individuals.It may seem that these disbursements, plus the in-
comes disbursed by industries making consumers' goods, must exceed
the value of consumers' goods sent to market. But in so far as pro-
ducers' goods are raw materials or 'supplies used up currently in con-
tributing toward the making of consumers' goods, their full selling
prices must be charged into the prices of the latter products, and the
incomes disbursed for making the materials and supplies can do no
more than equal this element in the prices of consumers' goods. There
remain some things which consumers are not called upon to buy on
completion; for example, public works and industrial equipment.
Incomes disbursed in making such goods add to consumer purchasing
power without adding an equivalent supply of consumers' goods.In.
periods of active construction, income payments on this account, plus
the payment of wages before products are sent to market, for a time
provide consumers with incomes exceeding the supplies of consumers'
goods then on sale.Such a situation, however, soon produces conse-
quences which end it.Prices of consumers' goods rise, that rise stimu-
lates production at once, and the difficulty reappears of main-
taining consumer purchasing power adequate to absorb the larger
output at the higher price level. The difficulty is further accentuated
as soon as the new industrial equipment on which men have been
working begins adding its quota, directly or indirectly, to the con-
sumers' goods flowing to market.
Thus "overproduction—a supply in excess of demand—is a purely
monetary phenomenon," and, as such, might be prevented by mone-
tary adjustments.
If corporations went on forever increasing their output, and,
in the process, expanding the volume of money in. circulation
at a slLfficient rate, and if the flow of the output to the markets
sufficiently lagged behind the flow of the new money as wages
to consumers, consumers might continue to buy all that the
markets actually offered.Such an expansion of money, how-
ever, does not long take place.Business men always fear a
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sumers to buy current output, they have no incentive for in-
creasing output—no motive for using bank loans for that pur-
pose.
But why should not business enterprises pay out the full values
received for their products, and thus prevent a deficiency of con-
sumer purchasing power? Because under modern conditions, a thriv-
ing enterprise must provide for expansion, and the safest way to
finance expansion is "to plough part of the profits into the business."
Messrs. Foster and Catchings believe that, on the average, American
corporations do not disburse as dividends much over half of their
profits. Nor would the situation necessarily be better if corporations
paid out all their profits as dividends, and financed their extensions
by selling stock to their shareholders.For in that case, consumers
would divert income which is needed to sustain the demand for con-
sumers' goods into demand for equipment, in orderto make still more
consumers' goods in the future.Even as matters stand, consumers
are continually saving current income, for reasons as sound as those
which justify the financial conservatism of corporations.And their
savings are as much responsible for the deficient demand for con-
sumers' goods as is the dividend policy of business enterprises.
To sum up:
Progress toward greater total production and resultant higher
standards of living is retarded because consumer buying does
not keep pace with production. Consumer buying lags behind
for two reasons: first, because, on account of corporate savings
industry does not disburse to consumers enough money to buy
the goods produced, without a fall in the price-level; second,
because consumers, under the necessity of saving, cannot spend
even as much money as they receive.Partly on account of
these savings, there is not an even flow of money from pro-
ducer to consumer, and from consumer back to producer.
Furthermore, the savings of corporations and individuals are
not used to purchase the goods already in the markets, but to
bring about the production of more goods. The expansion of
the volume of money does not fully make up the deficit, for
money is expanded mainly to facilitate production, and the
product must be sold to consumers for more money than the
expansion has provided. Consequently we make progress only
while we are filling the shelves with goods which must either
remain on the shelves as stock in trade or be sold at a loss,40 BUSINESS CYCLES
and while we are building more industrial equipment than we
canuse.Inadequacy of consumer income is, therefore, the
main reason, though not the only reason, why we do not long
continue to produce the wealth which natural resources, capi-
tal facilities, improvements in the arts and the self-interest of
employers and employees would otherwise enable us to pro-
duce.Chiefly because of shortage of consumer demand, both
capital and labor restrict output, and nations engage in those
struggles for outside markets and spheres of commercial influ-
ence which are the chief causes of war.8
While the Pollak group were developing their theory of business
cycles in this country, Mr. P. W. Martin of the International Labour
Office was working on similar lines in Switzerland.Martin holds
that the factor which ends phases of prosperity, and, he adds, the
factor which keeps production even in prosperous years far below
its attainable levels, is the impossibility of celling what we desire
to produce.In turn, the lack of markets is due to lack of "buying
power."But Martin differs from Foster and Catchings in paying
slight attention to the distinction, which they stress, between con-
sumers' and producers' goods. To maintain prosperity, it is quite as
necessary to have an adequate market for industrial equipment as
for clothing.And Martin ascribes the deficiency of buying power,
not to saving by corporations and individuals, but to the need of
larger "liquid capital" which prosperity brings.His summary runs:
So long as the community's buying power is used exclusively
to pay for goods, the price system works.But from time to
time industry must increase its liquid capital.This means
that part of the community's buying power, which is needed
to pay for goods if equilibrium between the flow of buying
power and the flow of prices is to be maintained, goes instead
'A brief sketch of this theory was given in 1923 by William T. Foster and Waddill
Catchings in chapter xx of Money (No. 2 of the Publications of the Pollak Foundation
for Economic Research). A more elaborate exposition was worked out by Hudson B.
Hastings in Costs and Profits (No. 3 of the same series), 1923. A later and somewhat
different statement is found in Foster and Catchings, Profits (No. S of the Pollak
series), 1925.The quotations are from p. 320 of Profits and pp. 16, 17, 28, and 29 of
"The Dilemma of Thrift," a summary of their theory by Foster and Catchings, re-
printed from the Atlantic Monthly, April, 1926.Business Without a Buyer, Foster and
Catchings' latest exposition, appeared after this chapter had been set up.(No. 10
of the Pollak series).
The Pollak theory relates to crises rather than to business cycles: it does not ex-
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to induce the production of more goods for sale.As a conse-
quence, goods are produced for which no buying power exists.
This "flaw in the price system" can be remedied by supplying
buyers with money enough to purchase what is offered for sale.
The first step will be for the Government, acting in agreement
with the banks, to increase buying power how, when, where
and to what extent the best available information shows to be
advisable, until unemployment is reduced to its minimum.
From that time on the Government and the banks will en-
deavour to adjust the additions to the community's buying
power so that it shall always be exactly sufficient to provide
an adequate market for the goods offered for sale.Their guide
in this will be the price level.If the price level falls, the nat-
ural indicator of a lack of markets, they will pump in addi-
tional buying power until the lack of markets is completely
obviated (as shown by the price level regaining its former
position).If prices rise, the signal of inflation, additions to
buying power will be made more slowly (if necessary buying
power will be drained out even), until the price level is brought
back to "normal," until, that is to say, all symptoms of infla-
tion have been totally eliminated.These measures will be
applied by special offices using the best knowledge and most
scientific instruments available.Supporting their efforts at
every turn will be the automatic action of the psychological
factor in industry, tending to be, not as now, an inflationary
agency during prosperity, a depressing agency during depres-
sion, but an automatic stabiliser of both prices and markets.4
Still another variation upon the income theme has been composed
by Dean Arthur B. Adams of the University of Oklahoma. An in-
crease in the buying of consumers' goods may lead to recovery from
depression; but it cannot initiate a period of prosperity.For busi-
ness in consumers' goods cannot give rise to money incomes which
exceed the sales value of the current output, and prosperity requires
that consumers be able to buy an increasing output at rising prices.
Therefore, it is an error to think that "recovery generates a period of
P. W. Martin, The Flaw in the Price ,System, London, 1924, and The Limited
Markef, London, 1926. The quotations are from the later bookpp. 53 54, 69 70.
The theory expounded by Major C. H. Douglas of the Royal Air Force in a series
of books seems to be an adumbration of the ideas worked out by the Pollak Foundation
group and by Mr. Martin.See, for example, Major Douglas' volumes, Credit Power
and Democracy. London, 1921, and Social Credit, London, 1924.42 BUSINESS CYCLES
prosperity," or that "business is always going through some phase
of a business cycle."The end of one cycle is sometimes separated
from the beginning of the next by a prolonged period of "oscillating
equilibrium." A new cycle does not start until something happens
to give consumers incomes exceeding the value of the consumers'
goods on sale.The factor which most often plays this role is "rapid
expansion of capital equipment," financed by expansion of bank
credit.Periods of prosperity, initiated by such developments, grow
more intense for a time, but are finally terminated by the following
"forces," working singly or together: (1) the output of consumers'
goods eventually overtakes and exceeds the volume of consumers'
incomes, (2) costs of production per unit eventually rise faster than
selling prices,(3) the banks eventually reach the limit of their
ability to increase loans.5
10. THE ROLE PLAYED BY PROFIT-MAKING
There remain the theories which explain business cycles by the
fact that the producing, transporting and distributing of goods are
conducted mainly by business enterprises which aim at making money.
Of course the theories already reviewed take the quest of profits for
granted; but they treat business enterprise as an organization through
which more fundamental forces operate.The distinguishing char-
acteristic of the theories now to be noticed is that they represent
the alternations of prosperity and depression as arising from certain
technical exigencies of profit-making itself.This view was developed
in 1904 by Dr. Thorstein Veblen, of the New School for Social Re-
search, and in 1906 by Professor Jean Lescure of the University of
Bordeaux.'
Dr. Veblen begins his discussion of "the theory of modern wel-
fare" by pointing out that prosperity, crisis, and depression
are primarily phenomena of price disturbance,...They
affect industry because industry is managed on a business
footing, in terms of price and for the sake of profits.
A period of prosperity is ushered in by a rise of prices, caused, for
example, by an increased supply of gold, or by heavy government
'See A. B. Adams, Economics of Business Cycles, New York, 1925.
The Theory oJ Business Enterprise, New York, 1904,chaptervii; Des Crises Gén-
érales et Périodsques de iSurproduction, Paris, 1906, 3rd ed., 1923. A summary of Les-
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purchases. This rise affects first some one industry or line of business,
which responds with a burst of activity and increased investment by
business men eager to exploit the profitable field.Partly by actual
increase of demand, partly by lively anticipation of future increases,
aggressive business enterprise extends its ventures and pushes up
prices in remoter branches of trade.
Now the growing demand and enhanced prices increase the pro-
spective profits of the business enterprises in each trade as they reach
it.Larger prospective profits lead to higher market capitalization
of the business enterprises, and, of course, higher market capitaliza-
tion means an increased value of the properties as collateral security.
Thus the way is paved for the marked extension of credit on which
the active trade is largely dependent.
This sequence of growing demand, rising prices, increasing ex-
pectations of profit, swelling capitalization of business enterprises,
and expanding credit keeps repeating itself on an ever growing scale
so long as its basis lasts—an anticipated increase in demand or selling
prices greater than the anticipated increase in costs.But eventually
the process undermines its basis.For the expense of doing business
rises with the increasing cost of labor, and with the gradual extension
of the advance in prices to all the commodities which business
enterprises buy.In the end, these costs gain so much upon prospec-
tive selling prices as to narrow the anticipated margins of profit.
Then the enhanced market capitalization of the business enterprises
begins to seem excessive. Consequently, the security behind the loans
which have been granted shrinks in the estimation of the business
community, and ceases to be regarded as an adequate guarantee of
repayment. The confident tone of business expectations which char-
acterized the period of prosperity yields to nervousness.To bring
on a general crisis, it needs but that some considerable creditor should
conclude that the present earning capacity of his debtors no longer
warrants the capitalization upon which their collateral is appraised.
When this happens liquidation begins, extending from one industry
to another and converting prosperity into depression.
Veblen differs from most writers in holding that, once begun, busi-
ness depression tends to perpetuate itself, instead of tending to pro-
duce a resumption of activity.The financial reorganization of em-
barrassed enterprises reduces their fixed charges, and turns the
weakest competitors into the most dangerous.Yet more important
is the unceasing advance in technical perfection which characterizes44 BUSINESS CYCLES
modern machine industry, and which enables the new plants which
are built from time to time to start with a marked initial advantage
in equipment over their partially antiquated predecessors.2The
difficulty of earning a fair profit without submitting to a reduction
of capitalization is made chronic by these conditions. Hence periods
of prosperity are taking on the character of episodes, initiated by
some extraordinary increase in the demand for goods, and running
out presently into the normal state of depression through the sequence
of events which has been recited.
To Veblen, then, the important factor in determining the char-
acter of a business period is the relation between current capitalization
and anticipated earning capacity. When prospective profits rise, busi-
ness has a season of prosperity, during which capitalization expands
rapidly. But rising costs always undermine the basis for anticipating
high profits and then capitalization is left higher than prospective
profits warrant. The latter situation characterizes depression.
The "profits theory" of business cycles has been accepted, or in-
dependently arrived at, by several writers since the publication of
Veblen's and Lescure's books.These recent versions differ from the
earlier models and from each other in the emphasis which they put
upon various factors affecting profits.Thus Professor Gustav Cassel
of the University of Stockholm ascribes especial importance to the
fluctuations in both interest rates and construction work.3Mr. F.
Lavington of the University of Cambridge, following Professor Pigou,
emphasizes fluctuations in business confidence.4 Major J. R. Bellerby
of the International Labour Office stresses the expansion of the cur-
rency as a factor in breeding booms, and the reduction of surplus
stocks of commodities and the artificial support of consumers' demand
as factors in starting revivals of activity.5Professor John Maurice
Clark of Columbia University has fitted into the profits theory his
acute analysis of the relation between the orders for new industrial
equipment and the rateofgrowth or shrinkage in the demand for
3Dr. Robert Liefmann suggests that this factor, the introduction of technical im-
provements in production and the consequent "scrapping" of equipment not yet amor-
tized, is the most fundamental cause of crises.See his Grundsätze der Volkstvirtschafts-
lehre, 2nd ed., Stuttgart and Berlin, 1922 vol. ii, pp. 840, 841.
The Theory of Social Economy, New York, 1924, Fourth Book.(First published
in Leipzig, 1918, Theoretische Sozialökonomie.)
'The Trade Cycle, an Account of the Causes Producing Rhythmical Changes in the
Activity of I3uciness.London, 1922. .
TheControlling Factor in Trade Cycles.Reprinted with additions from the
Economic Journal, September, 1923, vol. xxxiii, pp. 305-331.THE PROCESSES INVOLVED IN BUSINESS CYCLES 45
finished products.°Finally, Mr. Lawrence K. Frank has given a
"behavioristic" interpretation of business cycles which has so definite
a bearing upon current statistical work that it must be summarized.
The 'cause' (Mr. Frank remarks), if we wish to use that
term, of business cycles...isto be found in the habits and
customs (institutions) of men which make up the money
economy, with its money and credit, prices, private property,
buying and selling, and so on, all loaded, so to speak, on the
industrial process.
This institutional situation gives rise to alternations of "over-
buying" and "under-buying" by business men irt this way:In a
depression retail purchases of consumers' goods do not shrink greatly,
certainly not so much as the current production of these goods shrinks.
Hence depression sees a gradual dwindling of current stocks of finished
goods, and also a dwindling of the stocks of materials carried by
producers. Given that situation, it is merely a question of time when
retail merchants will find their assortments growing meager and will
be forced to increase their current orders for goods, even though their
current sales remain constant or contract slowly.When this time
does come, production of consumers' goods will pick up a bit.Be-
fore long, the producers from whom the retailers or wholesalers bought
will exhaust their supplies of materials and must increase the orders
they place with other producers.So an increase of buying, started
by retail merchants, spreads from group to group, and grows as it
spreads.
Each business man, as he sees his sales increasing, thinks it well
to acquire a larger stock of the goods he sells or uses."Moreover,
speculator-traders place orders for future delivery and begin to ac-
cumulate stocks."The consequence is that rates of production are
increased.Statistical evidence seems to show that this acceleration
of production becomes more rapid as it travels back from consumers'
goods through semi-finished commodities to raw materials and in-
dustrial equipment.But just as retail trade did not shrink greatly
during the depression, so now it does not expand greatly during
prosperity.Presently the rate of production exceeds the rate of
Studies in the Economics of Overhead Costs, Chicago, 1923, chapter xix.See also
Professor Clark's paper, "Business Acceleration and the Law of Demand: A Technical
Factor in Economic Cycles." Journal of Political Economy, March, 1917, vol. xxv, pp.
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consumption, and so produces an accumulation of stocks which grows
larger as long as the processes in question continue.
But these accumulations are limited by storage capacity and the
willingness of banks to lock up their funds in doubtfully liquid loans.
As these limits are approached, purchases decline.Then the stocks
of commodities are discovered to be overlarge for the reduced volume
of sales.To reduce stocks, men fill their current orders from goods
on hand and curtail production or orders from producers.Current
production then falls below current consumption.The business
groups which have accumulated the largest stocks—those furthest
from the retailers—will almost stop buying.
Hence the rates of production in the several stages will decrease
progressively faster going backward to raw materials, until the
end of the ensuing depression brings a revival again.7
To this exposition of Mr. Frank's, Dr. Thomas Warner Mitchell
of the Federal Trade Commission has made an important addition
by explaining how fluctuations in demand are amplified as they run
back through the channels of trade from consumers to producers of
raw materials. His explanation runs as follows:
(1) Because of the length, in time, of the whole production
process from the natural resources to the ultimate consumer,
and the length of time required for selecting and training per-
sonnel in building up a production organization, production
rates that have fallen below demand rates cannot quickly be
augmented to equal the demand rates, but require many
months to be so augmented.(2) There is deception and
illusion all along the line as to the real extent of demand, due
to over-ordering by customers.(3) The illusion is accentuated
under our atomistic competitive system by counting the same
demand several times over as it is presented to different atoms
in the industrial organization.All three operate together to
produce a grossly exaggerated measurement of demand in the
boom period, followed automatically by a crisis and by a gross
under-measurement of demand during the crisis and depres-
"A Theory of Business Cycles," by Lawrence K. Frank, Quarterly Journal of Faq-
nomics, August, 1923, vol. xxxvii, pp. 625-642.
Before Mr. Frank wrote, Mr. Henry S. Dennison had sketched a similar theory.
See "Management and the Business Cycle," Journal of the American Statistical Asso-
elation, March, 1922, vol. xviii, pp. 20-31.Dr. Simon S. Kuznets enriches the analysis
and shows its statistical support in his volume on Cyclical Fluctuations, Retail and
Wholesale Trade, United States, 1919-19.55, New York, 1926.THE PROCESSES INVOLVED IN BUSINESS CYCLES 47
sion; and that followed automatically, in turn, by another
boom. Consumers' psychology, manifested in the form of re-
sistance to the rising cost of living and a slowing-up of their
demand near the end of a boom period, accentuates the effect
of the superabundance with which the merchants' orders for
goods are eventually filled, and materially assists in precipitat-
ing a crisis.The cyclical movement, once started, tends to
complete and repeat itself automatically and perpetually.8
V.Plans for Further Work.
1. PROBLEMS RAISED BY TUE DIVERSITY OF EXPLANATIONS.
We began the preceding survey of current theories to find what
economic activities are involved in business cycles, and to get work-
ing hypotheses for use in a fresh attack upon the problem.It may
seem that we have been too successful: we have found so many
processes involved and have collected so many explanations that
the materials threaten to be confusing rather than illuminating.
What we sought was aid toward solving one problem: we now find
on our hands a new puzzle—to determine the relations among a lot
of theories.What explanations are incompatible with each other,
what are complementary? Each theory taken by itself seems plaus-
ible; but how can we work with so many hypotheses?Is it necessary
to test each hypothesis in turn? Must we plan an eclectic theory,
selecting useful elements from several different writers?Or can we
find some way of developing a thoroughly unified explanation of
business cycles, and yet incorporate the seemingly diverse hypotheses
with which we have become acquainted? 1
8"CompetitiveIllusion as a Cause of Business Cycles," Quareerly Journal of Eco-
nomics, August, 1924, vol. xxxviii, pp. 631-652.
humorous reader is invited to observe at this point what care has been taken
to economize his effort.In place of ten types of theories in some twenty variant forms,
twice or five times that number might have been put forward as having claims on his
attention. A look at the table of contents in von Bergman's Geschichte der National.-
ökonomischen Krssentheorsen (Stuttgart, 1895), or at the catalogue of any large library
of books on economics will show how much literature has been omitted. The list of
theories reviewed above is a most exclusive list, admitting only (with one diverting
exception) those oxplanations which can show the best of credentials.
Among the recent books passed over for one reason or another are the following:
Ludwig Pohie, Bevölkerungsbewegung, Kapitalbildung und periodische WirtschaJts-
krisen.Gottingen, 1902.
Pierre Vialles, L,a Consommatiori et les Crises Economiques.Paris, 1903.
Hugo Bilgram and Louis E. Levy, The Cause of Business Depressions.Philadelphia,
1914.
Daniel Bellet, Crises Economiques, Paris, 1918.
Wilhelm Ropke, Die Konjunktur. Jena, 1922.48 BUSINESS CYCLES
Embarrassing as the multiplicity of explanations may seem at
this stage, it is an embarrassment which must be faced, because it
arises from the complexity of the problem itself.Everyone who
has had practical experience in business knows that business is af-
fected by numberless factors physical, psychological, political, eco-
nomic or social in origin; local, national or world-wide in scope;
obvious or obscure in character and working; temporary or enduring
in effect. And everyone who has studied economics realizes that busi-
ness activity depends upon the smoothly coordinated functioning of
many processes, the extraction or growing of raw materials; the
fabricating, distributing, transporting and consuming of goods; the
paying and spending of money incomes; the saving and investing of
capital; the granting and canceling of credits.Any of these factors
or any of these processes can be made to yield a plausible theory of
business cycles, provided some investigator can show that it is an
independent source of recurrent fluctuations in the activity of trade.
And that is what each of our theorists believes himself to have done
with reference to the factor of his choice.Nor can we be sure in
advance that any one of them is wrong.
An easy affirmation that business cycles are exceedingly complex
phenomena is not an adequate preparation for constructive work.
To plan this work wisely we need to know what the complexities are.
Such knowledge we get in the most convincing way from the conclu-
sions reached by earlier investigators.It is for this reason that study
of current theories forms the best introduction to the subject, at its
present stage of development. Knowing what we now do, we should
be effectually guarded against the besetting sin of theorists in this
Hugh W. Sanford, The Business of Life, New York, 1924.Vol. i, pp. 1-222.
Paul Mombert, Eiriführung in dos Studium der Konjunktur. Leipzig, 1925.
Moreover, several important contributions have been mentioned but incidentally,
because they stress the joint importance of two or more processes which are exploited
separately in other writings. Comprehensiveness of view i certainly no defect; but the
complexity of business cycles can be exhibited most effectively by following many
leaders, each of whom focuses attention upon some single process and represents all
other developments as subordinate to, or as contributing to, his chosen chain of cause
and effect.If this chapter were intended to evaluate recent studies of business cycles,
the following books would have conspicuous places:
Dennis H. Robertson, A Study of Industrial Fluctuation, London, 1915; Banking
Policy and the Price Level, London, 1926.
Gustav Cassel, The Theory of Social Economy, Translated by Joseph McCabe, New
York, 1924.(First published in German, Leipzig, 1918.)
John Maurice Clark, The Economics of Overhead Costs, Chicago, 1923.
Arthur Spiethoff, "Krisen," Handuiörterbuch der Staatswissenschaf ten, 4th ed., Jena,
1925.Vol. vi, pp. 8-91.
Simon S. Kuznets, Cyclical Fluctuations, New York, 1926.THE PROCESSES INVOLVED IN BUSINESS CYCLES 49
field—neglecting phenomena which do not fit neatly into precon-
ceived schemes.
Realizing how many lines of analysis we must be ready to test and
perhaps to accept, we cannot regard the planning of our work as an
easy, or a brief task. We must provide a place for every line of
analysis which may prove important in the sequel, and yet not lose
our way in a maze of interactions. How to draw up such a plan is our
next concern.
2. A CLASSIFICATION OF THE THEORIES.
As the first step in this systematic planning of our work, we must
set our collection of working hypotheses in order.The exposition
given above proceeds as far as feasible from the simpler to the more
intricate theories. Now we can rearrange the theories on logical lines,
according to the processes which they stress.
First, the different theories may be classified as physical, emo-
tional and institutional explanations.' The large third class may then
b subdivided into (1) theories which find the source of fluctuations
in institutional change, and (2) theories which find the source of
fluctuations in the functioning of institutions in their present form.
Finally, the last named group may be further divided into four or
five species according to the economic processes in which fluctuations
are held to start: namely, theories concerned with (1) the quest of
profits, (2) the flow of incomes from business enterprises to mdi-
'Compare E. M. Patterson, "The Theories Advanced in Explanation of Economic
Crises," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, May, 1915,
vol. lix, pp. 133-147.
Since this chapter was written, Professor Warren M. Persons has published a classi-
fication of "theories of business fluctuations" which resembles the present classification
of theories of business cycles.See Quarterly Journal of Economics, November, 1926,
vol. xli, pp. 94-128.
Persons' classification is the first stage of a critical examination of "the theories
of butiness fluctuations." My classification is the first stage of a constructive study of
business cycles.Persons is interested primarily in the causes of business fluctuations
stressed by different writers: I am interested primarily in those parts of a theory which
offer working hypotheses which I can use.This difference between our aims leads us
at times to classify the same writer under quite different heads.To give a single
example: Professor Persons ranks Dr. Veblen among those who emphasize "factors
other than economic institutions," because Veblen holds that revivals "are pretty
uniformly traceable to specific causes extraneous to the process of industrial business
proper."However, Persons notes that Veblen's analysis of prosperity, crisis, and de-
pression runs in terms of economic activities.For my purposes, itis this analysis
which is most significant in Veblen's theory.I therefore rank Veblen among the
writers who treat business cycles in terms of institutional factors, and merely mention
his view that some "disturbing cause" from outside the system of business dealings is
necessary to revive activity after a depression.(See above section iv, 10).50 BUSINESS CYCLES
viduals and frcm individuals back to business enterprises, (3) the
balance between rates of production and of consumption at large,
(4) the special balance between personal consumption and the pro-
duction of industrial equipment (the under- and over-savings, as
well as the construction theories), and (5) the functioning of the
banks in relation to the rest of the community.
For ready reference from time to time, it will be convenient to
have this classification, with some elaboration of detail, set out in
tabular form.
A CLASSIFICATION OF CURRENT THEORIES OF BUSINESS CYCLES.
I.Theories which trace business cycles to physical processes
1.Three-and-a-half-year cycles of solar radiation produce similar
cycles of crop yields, and so seven- or ten-year cycles of business
activity. H. S. Jevons.
2.Eight-year periods in the conjunction of Venus produce similar
cycles in mundane weather, crop yields, and business.Henry
L. Moore.
3. Weather cycles affect health, health affects mental attitudes, and
mental attitudes affect business.Ellsworth Huntington.
A theory intermediate between the groups stressing physical and in-
stitutional processes.
Industries which depend upon organic, and industries which de-
pend upon inorganic materials have unlike rhythms.The re-
sulting disturbances and restorations of balance produce busi-
ness cycles.Werner Sombart.
II.Theories which trace business cycles to emotional processes
1. "Optimistic error and pessimistic error, when discovered, give birth
to one another in an endless chain."A. C. Pigou.
2.Thefluctuations of birth rates and death rates are chiefly responsi-
ble for mass alternations of optimism and pessimism, and thus
indirectly responsible for alternations of prosperity and depres-
sion.M. B. Hexter.
III. Theories which trace businss cycles to institutional processes
1.Cycles arise from the change of institutions.
(1) Social progress is by nature jerky: changes in its pace and
direction produce disturbances from time to time in the
moving equilibrium of economic processes.Emanuel H.
Vogel.
(2) Innovations come in waves, and initiate periods of activity.
followed by crises and depressions.Joseph Schumpeter,
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2.Cycles arise from the functioning of existing institutions.
(1) From the technical exigencies of money-making:
Fluctuations in prospective profits cause fluctuations in busi-
ness capitalization and confidence; the latter in turn give
rise to new fluctuations in prospective profits.Thorstein
Veblen, Jean Lescure.
The money economy leads to fluctuations in mercantile orders,
manufacturing and the production of raw materials which
are progressively larger than the fluctuations in consumers'
purchases, upon which all business depends, directly or in-
directly, for its market. Henry S. Dennison, Lawrence K.
Frank, Simon S. Kuznets.
The reason why the aforesaid fluctuations grow wide as one
passes from consumer demand toward the production of
raw materials lies in the competitive illusion to which our
business system gives rise.Thomas W. Mitchell.
(2) From lack of equilibrium in the processes of disbursing and
spending incomes and of producing values:
Incomes paid to wage earners lag behind changes in the money
value of goods produced, thus making consumers' demand
alternaliily larger and smaller than current supply.R. E.
May.
Inequalities in the rates at which prices rise and fall cause
consumers' incomes to lag behind the output of consumers'
goods in prosperity, and to exceed that output in depres-
sion.Emil Lederer.
Incomes disbursed by business enterprises to individuals are
alternately less and more than the full value of the goods
produced for sale; the fluctuations thus initiated are en-
hanced by the savings of individuals.Waddill Catchings,
William T. Foster and Hudson B. Hastings.
Prosperity requires an increase of liquid capital, which can
be provided only out of funds which must be spent for
consumers' goods if prosperity is to continue.Recovery
comes because depression checks the growth of liquid capi-
tal.P. W. Martin.
Consumers' incomes can be made to exceed the value output
of consumers' goods only by expansion of capital equip-
ment, financed by expansion of bank credit.But this con-
dition, which characterizes prosperity, works its own un-
doing.A. B. Adams.
(3) From lack of equilibrium in the process of producing and
consuming goods in general:
Waves of general over-production result from "the well-nigh52 BUSINESS CYCLES
universal fact of industrial competition."Sir William H.
Boveridge.
The uncertainty involved in all business planning leads to
alternate over- and under-production of goods.Charles 0.
Hardy.
Good trade leads to rapid increase in industrial equipment and
later in output, and finally to a decline in the marginal de-
mand prices for consumers' goods.A depression follows
in which the growth of industrial equipment and output is
checked. The marginal demand prices for consumers' goods
finally rise again, and a new period of activity begins.
Albert Aftalion, Mentor Bouniatian.
(4) From lack of equilibrium in the processes of consuming, sav-
ing, and investing capital in new construction:
In prosperity the demand for capital exceeds current savings;
the resulting scarcity of capital brings on a crisis.In de-
pression, investment falls below current savings; free capital
accumulates until investing becomes aggressive once more
and starts a new period of activity.Michel Tugan-Bara-
novski.
Large incomes, which grow rapidly in prosperity, lead to over-
saving and over-investment in new plants, so that supply
exceeds current demand.Depression follows, in which the
large incomes are reduced, and over-saving ceases, so that
consumption catches up with output and starts a revival.
John A. Hobson.
Crises are caused by over-production of industrial equipment
and concomitant under-production of the goods necessary
to use that equipment.Arthur Spiethoff.
Relatively slight changes in demand for consumers' goods
and in costs of construction cause far more violent changes
in the volume of construction work: the latter changes react
to heighten and propagate changes in the demand for con-
sumers' goods.George H. Hull.
Over-commitments to business extensions of all sorts involve
additions to purchasing power not counterbalanced by in-
creased production.Prices rise until they reach a level at
which men see danger in adding to their stocks.Then
purchasing contracts and a crisis comes.Malcom C. Rorty.
(5) From the processes of banking:
Banks increase the purchasing power of business men, when
prospects are favorable, by lending credit; the activity thus
stimulated grows cumulatively until the banks are forced
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during which idle funds accumulate in the banks and enable
them to start a new movement of expansion.Alvin H.
Hansen.
When banks have large reserves they reduce discount rates,
and thus encourage borrowing and business expansion,
which grows cumulatively until the banks find that larger
cash requirements are impairing their reserves. Then banks
raise discount rates, restrict loans and thus reduce business
activity.Funds again accumulate in the banks because
cash requirements are now smaller, and the cycle starts
afresh.R. G. Hawtrey.
The exceedingly condensed summaries in this table do no more
than suggest the central theses maintained by the writers named.
One who has not read the books drawn upon, or at least read the
preceding section on "Current Theories of Business Cycles," will find
the entries scarcely intelligible and may well distrust his own guesses
at their meaning. Of course the classification provides no single niche
for men like Mr. Robertson, Mr. Lavington, Professor Cassel, Pro-
fessor J. M. Clark and Major Bellerby who make large use of several
different causes of fluctuations. Nor does the table show the effective
supplementary use made by many writers of ideas other than their
leading theses.
3. THE NECESSITY FOR MAKING MEASUREMENTS.
Regarding the technical methods to be used in the investigation
one broad conclusion is already clear.The conception of business
cycles as congeries of changes in numerous processes running abreast
or following each other—a conception made vivid by the review of
current theories—shows the need of quantitative knowledge. What is
the relative importance of the factors represented as causes of
fluctuations?What is the relative amplitude of the fluctuations
characteristic of these factors and of the effects which they are said
to produce?In what sequence do the fluctuations appear and at
what intervals of time? These are but samples of the quantitative
problems which become crucial in an effort either to testa given
theory or to do constructive work. Such problems can be solved only
by appeal to statistics.
Indeed, our best chance of improving upon the work of earlier
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the record for study, because of the widening scope of statistical
compilations and the progressive refinement of statistical technique,
the latest investigator has a quasi-mechanical advantage over his
predecessors, plus the advantage of profiting by his predecessors' ideas.
Nor is this advantage of more precise knowledge limited to recent
cycles.To-day we have better data concerning the trade fluctuations
after the Napoleonic Wars than were available to Sismondi, or Jevons,
or Tugan-Baranovski.Obviously we should exploit this advantage
to the full, not forgetting that the figures are of little use except as
they are illuminated by theory.
4. CAUSAL THEORY AND ANALYTIC DESCRIPTION.
The next step in planning our work is to drag into the light for
inspection the tangled problem of cause and effect which most of
the theorists have tried to solve.
The usual aim of writers upon business cycles is to show where
and how wave movements startr—that is, to discover "the cause" of
business cycles. A second aim, followed in the full-length discussions,
is to show how the original wave movement spreads from its source
over all the processes of industry, commerce, and finance.This spread
'is also treated in terms of cause a.nd effect, but the causal relations
grow intricate. The first effects become causes producing new effects,
which act as new causes, and so on.Often the analysis moves con-
sciously in a circle or a spiral; the final effects reënforce the first cause,
or after a lapse of time start the first cause into activity again, or
even produce the first cause afresh.'
This broadening of business-cycle theories from the effort to dis-
cover causes into an effort to explain the full round of events is de-
manded by both our scientific and our practical interests.But as our
knowledge grows wider and more intimate, our attitude toward the
discussion of causes undergoes a subtle change. When we have ac-
counted in casual terms for each stage in a lengthy series of actions
and reactions, we find that our analysis deals with many causes, each
one of which is logically indispensable to the theory we have elabo-
rated.On reflection, we see the application to our work of the old
contention that the idea of causation has pragmatic, rather than
'Of course there is nothing "vicious" in a circle of this sort.The argument is not
circular in the sense of depending upon itself, but in the sense of following a process
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scientific, warrant.All the conditions which are indispensable to
produce a certain result stand on much the same footing from the
viewpoint of science. But there may be practical reasons why, from
the many conditions indispensable to produce certain results, we
should single out some one or more for special attention, and call
them "the cause" or "the causes."We stand a better chance of
making a wise selection of factors for special attention, however, if
we have already gained a scientific understanding of the process as
a whole.
In the progress of knowledge, causal explanations are commonly
an early stage in the advance toward analytic description. The more
complete the theory of any subject becomes in content, the more
mathematical in form, the less it invokes causation.In business-
cycle theory, the transformation from causal explanations into analytic
description is being hastened by free use of statistical materials and
methods. What time series can be made to show are functional re-
lationships. We are always reading something into statistics, when
we assert that the process represented by one series exercises a causal
influence upon the process represented by a second series.Yet a stiff
refusal to employ causal expressions in the detail of our investigation
might often hamper us.In the present stage of our knowledge, we
can probably make more rapid progress toward attaining insight into
business cycles, by using the thought-forms of daily life than by
trying to express ideas at which we are grasping in the form which
may ultimately prevail.
5. HISTORY AND THEORY.
A few business-cycle theorists not only work forward from "the
cause" of wave movements to its effects, but also work backward
from "the cause" to its cause.As already noted, Professor Tugan-
Baranovski, after expounding his theory of the alternate accumula-
tion and exhaustion of uninvested loan funds, adds,
itis the inadequate remuneration of labor, and the
consequent misery of the working classes, that is the funda-
mental cause of the rapid accumulation of social capital which
provokes crises.1
Similarly, Professor Aftalion, after tracing the origin and development
of general over-production through two volumes, remarks at the end,
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It is to the conditions established by the capitalist technique
of production that we must attribute the great difficulty of
avoiding error.It is this technique, after all, which must bear
the responsibility for the appearance of over-production.2
And Mr. Frank, after exploiting the difference in the rhythms of
consumption and production, concludes by saying,
The 'cause,' if we wish to use that term, of business cycles
•..isto be found in the habits and customs (institi.tions)
of men which make up the money economy.
•.
Presumably,this contention, that business cycles arise from that
peculiar form of economic organization which has come to prevail in
England within the last two centuries, and over much of the world
in more recent times, would be admitted by most theorists.On this
view, of course, the cause of business cycles lies enmeshed among
the causes that produced modern money economy, or capitalism.
Needless to say, our theorists have not followed the logical im-
plications of this historical perspective. No one writes an economic
history of mankind as a prolegomenon to a theory of business cycles.
The current practice is to take the existing scheme of institutions
for granted, and to show how cyclical oscillations come to pass under
this régime.
Nor do our theorists treat business cycles as episodes each of
which is to be fully accounted for on historical grounds.On the
contrary, they consciously endeavor to abstract from the peculiarities
of particular cycles, in order that they may arrive at a clearer under-
standing of the generic features.The statistical investigator does
the best he can to segregate the cyclical oscillations in his time series
from all complicating features, and for this purpose he has developed
an elaborate technique.4The man of speculative temper does his
abstracting in bolder fashion.Surveying the phenomena of concrete
experience, he seeks to fasten on the factors of chief moment, and
to isolate these factors in his thoughts.By a series of imaginary
experiments, he develops a synthetic account of cyclical oscillations
which contains enough of reality to be enlightening and not so much
as to be confusing.
Les Crises Pe'riodiques de Surproduction, vol. ii, pp. 359, 360.
3"A Theory of Business Cycles," Quarterly Journal of Economics, August, 1923, vol.
xxxvii, p. 639.
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Of course, there is no logical opposition between the theoretical
and the historical viewpoints, any more than there is opposition be-
tween causation and analytic description. On the contrary, history
and theory supplement each other.The theorist who wishes to
analyze the workings of current economic institutions needs a vivid,
objective view of their characteristics. That view he can obtain most
effectively by a study of their evolution.Nor is current history less
important to him than history of the past.It is only by historical
observations that he can determine what features of business cycles
are common and what are occasional, a matter upon which he should
satisfy himself before he devises his imaginary experiments.So, too,
the statistical worker appeals to history for help in performing the
most difficult of his technical tasks—separating "irregular" from
cyclical fluctuations. And by whatever methods a theorist works, he
may—and should—-check his explanations by seeing how far they
account for the cycles of history.
Several distinguished theorists have prepared themselves for ex-
plaining cyclical phenomena by elaborate historical investigations.
For example, Tugan-Baranovski wrote the history of English crises
from 1825 to 1910; Bouniatian carried the account back to 1640;
Lescure begins his treatise with a history of French, German, Eng-
lish, and American crises from 1810 to 1922.Doubtless many
theorists, without making first-hand historical researches for them-
selves, have studied such historical accounts.To follow the prece-
dent is an obvious piece of common sense.Indeed, we should strive
to achieve a closer blending than our predecessors have accomplished
of the data and the suggestions afforded by history with the hypoth-
eses suggested by economic theory.The statistical series we shall
analyze are fragments of the historical record.The business annals
summarized in a later chapter are a condensed account of cyclical
fluctuations in numerous countries at different stages of development.
These collections of historical materials, and economic history in its
more elaborate form, we can use to exhibit the general characteristics
of modern economic organization, to aid in determining what features
are common to business cycles at large, to suggest hypotheses, and
to test our conclusions.
'See M. Tugan-Baranovski, Les Crises Industriefles en Angete.Te, Paris, 1913, Part
s: M. Bouniatian, Geschichte der Handelskrisen in Er,i1and, 1640-1840, Munich, 1908;
J. Lescure, Des Crises Générales et Périodiques de Surproduction, 3d ed., Paris, 1923,
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6. THE FRAMEWORK OF THE INVESTIGATION.
Another step in planning our work is to decide whether we shall
use a framework provided by the theories we have reviewed, or a
framework provided by the subject matter.
It is possible to take up the theories one by one, make a critical
examination of the evidence offered in support of each, at need
devise new tests, and treat conclusions regarding the validity of each
theory as our main objective.It is also possible to take up the suc-
cessive phases of business cycles one by one, collect facts regarding
periods of prosperity, crisis, depression and revival in different coun-
tries at different times, use the theories to suggest facts which should
be gathered and relations looked for, and make conclusions regarding
the fluctuations our main objective, treating verdicts upon the theories
as by-products to be turned out when convenient.
Between these two procedures it is easy to choose.What we
want is insight into the facts. We care about the theories only as
aids toward attaining such insight. The plan of testing theories would
indeed lead to work with the facts, but in an artificial order, and
one involving much repetition.At best it would turn into a study
of one or two processes at a time in successive phases of the cycle,
whereas we are concerned primarily with these phases, and wish to
discover the relations among different processes which give each
phase its character and at the same time transform it into the fol-
lowing phase.1
But if we are to use the phases of business cycles as a framework,
we run grave risk of getting hopelessly confused in a maze of inter-
acting processes.That danger the review of current theories has
made startlingly clear.The physical processes of making and con-
suming goods of numberless kinds, the business processes of buying
and selling, the flow of money incomes to and from individuals,
the circulation of money and credit, borrowing and lending, saving
and investing must all be watched in relation to each other—and
each of these processes is itself a complex of variables.
To guard against losing our way in this tangle, we must get as
clear a view as possible of the organic relations among these various
is the less need for making a critical study of the several theories because
Professor Warren M. Persons has promised to perform that arduous task.See the
first paper in the series, "Theories of Business Fluctuations," Quarterly Journal of
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processes before we begin to study their fluctuations from phase to
phase of the cycle.That is, we must survey that form of economic
organization which has come to prevail in all "advanced" communi-
ties as if it were a curiosity instead of our familiar environment.In
particular, we must get what light existing statistics shed upon the
relative magnitude of those factors which our survey of current
theories has pointed out as playing important roles in business
cycles.2
2Inhis recent critique of current German studies of business cycles, Dr. Adolf Lowe
makes the following comment upon the treatment of facts and theory in my earlier
book upon business cycles:
As in all social-economic work, so in our narrower field, the analysis of facts
forms the second chapter of an exposition.it must be preceded by a chapter on the
theory of business cycles.Such is always the order in truth, even though the first
chapter remains unwritten, and though (worse still) the writer is not conscious that
his mind harbors a theory.For it is theory which provides the principles by which
the irreproducible fullness of reality can be set in order; it is theory which formu-
lates the questions which the facts must answer.(See "Der gegenwhrtige Stand der
Konjunkturforschung in Deutscliland," in Die WirtschaftwissenschaJt nach dem
Kriege, Festgabe für LujoBrenfano.Munich and Leipzig, 1925, vol. ii, p. 367.I
have translated freely in an effort to preserve the vigor of the original.)
I cannot claim to heed Dr. Lowe's counsel in the present volume, unless my vague
impressions concerning what phenomena should be looked into deserve to be called a
theory.Of course Chapter I does treat theories of business cycles, but it uses these
theories to reveal certain facts—that is, to show how many processes run side by side
in cyclical fluctuations.In the light of these results, I pass on in Chapter II to discuss
modern economic organization, in Chapter III to treat statistical problems, and in
Chapter IV to draw conclusions from business annals, all before I undertake in Chapter
V to formulate a definite conception of business cycles.As for a theory of the subject,
that is deferred to Volume II.This order seems to me more likely to lead to the
discovery of new truth than a treatment which begins with a "theory" and then looks
for "facts."
Dr. Lowe's view of the relations between facts and theory in scientific work is a
common one. But it seems to me over-schematic. Against the statement, "One cannot
set economic facts in order unless one has a theory" (I should prefer to say "hypothe-
sis"), can be put the statement, "One cannot form an economic theory unless one knows
some facts." And both these statements overlook the fact that the two categories are
not mutually exclusive. The theories with which science works cannot be conceived as
existing apart from the facts of human experience, and men can apprehend facts only
in terms of the notions with which their minds are furnished.The more thoughtfully
one considers the relations between these two phases of knowing, the less separable
they become. Even on the basis of the crude usage which contrasts fact and theory,
it is futile to debate which of the two comes first in the history of the race, in the life
of an individual, in the growth of a science, or in the progress of an investigation.
What is clear is that in scientific work these two blends, knowledge of fact and theo-
retical conceptions, keep stimulating, extending and enriching each other. An investi-
gator who starts with what purports to be an exposition of theory is tacitly using the
facts by which the ideas have been molded. And one who starts with what purports
to be an exposition of facts, is tacitly using the theoretical conceptions by which facts
have been apprehended. Whether it is better to begin a particular task by elaborating
upon the theoretical conceptions employed, sayinglittle about the facts for the
moment; or to begin by elaborating upon the facts, saying little about theories for the
moment, depends upon the problem in hand and upon the contribution which the
investigator hopes to make toward its solution.In an investigation of moment, both60 BUSINESS CYCLES
This survey is the most important step in preparing for the con-
structive work we hope to accomplish.To it is devoted the next
chapter.
the theory and the facts are elaborated at various stages of the proceedings, each by the
aid of the other, and later workers start with a fact-theory blend improved by the new
contribution.